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This paper develops a context-specific model (Greif, 1997) to analyze the case of 
failed market-oriented reform in Colombia during 1974-78. The methodology keeps 
the  contextual  specificity  at  a  manageable  level,  which  is  no  more  than  the 
institutional structure under consideration, while it tries to maintain a parsimonious 
model. The theoretical framework is inscribed in the rational choice approach and 
game theory.  This paper raises a standard question in economic reforms literature: 
why  did  the  reforms  fail?  More  comprehensively,  what  impeded  progressive 
institutional change in this case? The answer is based on modelling theoretically 
and  historically  the  strategic  dilemmas  brought  about  by  the  reforms  and 
internacional shocks. Government appears here as an inflexible agenda setter poorly 
endowed; Coffee as the dominant player whose short-run interests won through, and 
Industry as the weak player who openly opposed to policies that the G-Cs coalition 
set  out  with  the  1976  coffee  boom.  Ultimately  the  reforms  failed  because  of  
G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   p o o r   u n d e r s t a n d i n g   o f   a n d   limited  autonomy  for  solving  the 
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Market-oriented reforms in developing and ex-soviet countries have posed several puzzles 
not  only  for  policymakers  but  also  for  theorists.  The  change  from  pervasive  state  economic 
interventionism to economies driven by economic forces that freely allocate resources has brought a 
variety of mixed experiences. While successful cases enjoy high economic growth rates and seem 
well positioned for facing global market challenges, failed cases show economic backwardness to 
different extents and reinforce their inability to reach higher development. Policymakers have the 
sense of working with a black box in which they introduce policies and obtain outcomes that are 
difficult to fully explain.   
 
The existing literature on economic reform has stressed punctual aspects of reform design 
and implementation in order to identify the elements and procedures that are crucial for a successful 
economic reform. Economists and political scientists have pointed out both empirical regularities 
and theoretical insights on the political economy of the reform cases in many countries. At the core 
of this literature is the idea that the reforms raise essential strategic issues. Because economic 
reforms aim at changing the status quo, the emergence of opposing interests d e t e r m i n e s   a g e n t s ‟  
reluctance or willingness to embrace the change (Nelson et al. 1989, Dornbusch 1993, Bates and 
Krueger 1993, Williamson 1994, Haggard and Web 1994, Krueger 2000, Teichman 2001, Williams 
2001). Nonetheless, analytical models that offer parsimonious explanations of reform success are 
still in their infancy (Sturzenegger and Tommassi 1998). 
 
This literature emphasizes the institutional structure and how agents respond to it. Once the 
focus is placed on institutions, it is clear that an economic reform is no more than a disruptive and 
c o n s c i o u s   a t t e m p t   t o   c h a n g e   t h e   e c o n o m y ‟ s   i n s t i t u t i o n a l   f r a m e w o r k .   T o   p u t   i t   d i f f e r e n t l y ,   i t   i s   s o c i a l  
engineering through economic policy. Under this light, a failed reform means the failure to adopt 
efficient institutions that could stimulate a public good as it is economic growth. The persistence of 
a status quo dominated by redistributive institutions – institutions that improve the conditions of one 
group at expenses of the rest of the society, indicates the absence of progressive institutional change 
for  the  collectivity.  Unsurprisingly,  this  absence  raises  questions  which  are  substantial  to  the 
diagnosis  and  design  of  policies  intended  to  foster  progress  in  less  developed  countries. 
Understanding how the regressive factors to institutional change are connected and how they could 
be modified would be a powerful tool for accurately designing policies and foreseeing desirable 
policy  outcomes.  A  comprehension  of  these  issues  will  shed  light  on  the  black  box  that 
policymakers try to shape and scholars intend to explain. 
 
Although the research has established some policy-implementation lessons and identified 
certain strong regularities in successful cases, the results are still dispersed and have not yet been 
systemat i c a l l y   i n t e g r a t e d .   H a g g a r d   p o i n t s   o u t   t h a t   t h e   l i t e r a t u r e   i s   “ v a s t ,   u n w i e l d y ,   a n d ,   i n   t y p i c a l  
a c a d e m i c   f a s h i o n ,   i n c r e a s i n g l y   b a l k a n i z e d ”   ( 2 0 0 0 ,   2 1 ) .   C e r t a i n l y ,   t h e   h i g h   i m p o r t a n c e   o f   t h e  
context and peculiarities of every case have prevented generalizations. Also, the approaches of 
political scientists, economists and sociologists differ, making it difficult to integrate insights. On 
the economic side, the discipline from which I come, the theoretical models, still appealing insofar 
as key aspects are uncovered, have low explanatory power because they are highly abstract and 
involve overly restrictive assumptions.   
 
A  way  to  build  a  bridge  between  theory  and  empirical  evidence  so  as  to  bring  about 
meaningful  interpretations  and  establish  well-sounded  comparative  analysis  is  through  context-
specific models (Greif 1997). The methodology keeps the contextual specificity at a manageable  
 
4 
level, which is no more than the institutional structure under consideration, while it tries to maintain 
a parsimonious model. The theoretical framework is inscribed in the rational choice approach and 
game theory. Basic macroeconomics and notions from new institutionalism are applied as well. 
Unlike abstract models, a richer picture of particular actors, their beliefs, sequences and patterns of 
interaction portray a realistic scenario in an analytic approach. The advantage of following this 
approach is promising; by reducing the level of abstraction and incorporating restrictions based on 
an actual scenario, theoretical devices are able to provide a systematic and useful interpretation of 
reality. As context narrows the set of multiple equilibria, a meaningful concept of solution opens up 
the  possibility  of  discriminating  outcomes  and  making  sense  of  both  theoretical  and  historical 
results. Deductive and historical analyses hand in hand play a major role in shedding light on 
e c o n o m i c   a n d   p o l i t i c a l   p h e n o m e n a .   T h i s   p a t h   h a s   b e e n   c a l l e d   “ analytical narratives” ,   w h i c h   w a s  
borne as  the  synthesis  of political  scientists and  economists  working  together in  seeking  more 
appropriate  methodologies  in  social  sciences.  Instead  of  seeking  out  universal  laws,  this 
methodology aims at grasping the richness of social organizations (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal 
and Weingast 1998).  
 
This paper develops a context-specific model to analyze the case of failed market-oriented 
reform in Colombia during 1974-7 8 .   T h e   c a s e   c a l l e d   m y   a t t e n t i o n   b e c a u s e   i n   t h e   1 9 7 0 ‟ s   t h e   c o u n t r y  
seemed to experience a turning point in its economic performance. High growth rates from years of 
import-substituting  industrialization  were  left  behind,  leaving  instead  a  steady  and  average 
economic growth rate but amidst a context of constant social turmoil (Garcia and Jayasuriya 1997, 
vii). Only recently have Colombian economists appreciated the long-term declining trend in the 
economic growth rate (Cardenas 2002). I decided to explore the role of political and economic 
d e c i s i o n s   m a d e   b y   l e a d i n g   a c t o r s   i n   t h e   1 9 7 0 ‟ s   f o r   t r a c k i n g   t h e   c a u s e s   o f   t h e   s l u g g i s h   e c o n o m i c  
dynamic  in  the  country.  My  choice  was  to  focus  on  the  1974-78  government,  specifically  on 
economic reforms. Other scholars would have to judge whether my insights allow for crafting a 
more  systematic  explanation  of  path  dependence  thereby  Colombia  developed  an  institutional 
structure that openly hampered long-term economic growth.  Also, they must judge whether we are 
ready to grasp the nature of the relationship between politics and economics in the country. 
 
This paper raises a standard question in economic reforms literature: why did the reforms 
fail? More comprehensively, what impeded progressive institutional change in this case? I will 
answer this question based on a simple game theory model that addresses the strategic dilemmas 
brought about by the reforms. The players are collective actors: Government and two economic 
s e c t o r s :   I n d u s t r y   a n d   C o f f e e .   T h e   g a m e   r e f l e c t s   t h e   i n s t i t u t i o n a l   s t r u c t u r e   t h a t   f r a m e s   p l a y e r s ‟  
interaction through two channels; first, by defining the players and their power relationships. The 
second  chan n e l   o p e r a t e s   t h r o u g h   p l a y e r s ‟   d e c i s i o n   r u l e s   w h i c h   p r o v i d e   t h e   m i c r o -foundations 
d e t e r m i n i n g   t h e   g a m e ‟ s   o u t c o m e s .   S i n c e   t h e   e x e r c i s e   i s   a   m i x t u r e   o f   e c o n o m i c   h i s t o r y   a n d   t h e o r y ,  
neither  an  exhaustive  picture  of  the  1970´s  Colombian  experience  will  be  provided  nor  a 
sophisticated game theory model. Instead, the interested reader is invited to examine the references. 
O t h e r   s c h o l a r s ‟   w o r k ,   m a i n l y   e c o n o m i s t s   a n d   h i s t o r i a n s ,   a s s i s t e d   i n   t h e   l a b o r   o f   b u i l d i n g   t h e  
context; historical information was also extracted from presidential discourses, declarations of high 
officials, documents of associations, newspapers, and official legislation during the 1974-78 period.    
The paper progresses as follows. Section two considers a brief discussion on the problems 
of modeling economic reforms. This section draws upon the literature on economic reforms, new 
institutional  economics,  political  economy  and  game  theory.  It  aims  to  give  a  sense  of  the 
methodology, its key assumptions and limitations. Section three develops the model by setting out 
the historical evidence and translating it into theoretical relationships like strategies, preferences, 
and game outcomes. To conclude, section five summarizes the results and offers insight on the 
effects of the economic reform, the nature of institutional change and its impact on the economic 





II.  Modeling Institutional Change Induced by Economic Policies  
 
 
North – and the Neoinstitutionalism, explains institutional change as the result of continuous 
interaction  between  institutions  (rules  of  the  game)  and  organizations  (groups  of  individuals). 
Institutions provide incentives and frame competition among organizations in an economic setting 
of scarcity. The institutional arrangement provides a payoff-structure that determines the viability 
a n d   p r o f i t a b i l i t y   o f   o r g a n i z a t i o n s .   T h e   o r g a n i z a t i o n s ‟   p e r c e p t i o n s   o f   h i g h e r   p a y o f f s   d e r i v e d   f r o m   a n  
alternative  institutional  structure  will  shape  institutional  change.  However,  the  payoffs  should 
exceed the transaction costs that the change entails. Endogenous competition forces or exogenous 
factors  in  the  external  environment  alter  relative  prices  and  induce  institutional  innovations. 
However,  the  nature  of  the  innovations  ultimately  hinge  on  the  mental  constructs  of  the 
organizations insofar as they help individuals to interpret information and guide their actions (North 
2005, 59-64). 
 
Shepsle, working in a game theory approach, offers a similar vision on institutional change. 
Institutions are the result of rational selection and can be described as games whose purpose is to 
d e f i n e   p a r t i c u l a r   r u l e s   t o   g o v e r n   p l a y e r s ‟   i n t e r a c t i o n .   T h e   s e l e c t i o n   o f   a n   i n s t i t u t i o n   d e n o t e s   a n  
e q u i l i b r i u m   r e f l e c t i n g   p l a y e r s ‟   p r e f e r e n c e s ,   o p t i m i z a t i o n   b e h a v i o r   a n d   s p e c i f i c   i n s t i t u t i o n a l   f e a t u r e s .  
Thus, an institution arises as a structure-induced equilibrium, which will be maintained only if no 
p l a y e r   d e s i r e s   t o   a l t e r   h i s   s t r a t e g y   g i v e n   t h e   o t h e r   p l a y e r s ‟   s t r a t e g i c   c h o i c e s .   C o n v e r s e l y ,   t h e  
institution is not robust and is subject to innovation when there is any decisive coalition willing to 
implement some alteration of the arrangement (Shepsle 1989).  
 
Understanding  institutional  change  can  be  seen  as  the  study  of  context-specific  strategic 
interactions. Such an endeavor builds on game theory models as well as on the history of the case 
under  analysis.  Game  theory  provides  the  analytical  guide  to  identify  general  interaction 
possibilities  whereas  a  specific  case  lays  down  the  players,  their  mind-set  and  allowable 
alternatives. In this way, the set of agents and alternatives is narrowed down from abstract and 
infinite equilibria to a few concrete and meaningful alternatives (Greif 1997).  
 
Building a bridge between game theory models and case analysis involves the need to overcome 
two obstacles. First, models are developed in a highly abstract and mathematical manner, using 
over-simplistic  assumptions  about  political  and  economic  mechanisms  which  are  ruling  the 
interactions
2. Furthermore, studies on cases in which strategic situations are central find  it difficult 
t o   e x p l i c i t l y   a d o p t   a n   a n a l y t i c a l   m o d e l ;   a s   a   r e s u l t ,   t h e   a s s u m p t i o n s   a b o u t   p l a y e r s ‟   p r e f e r e n c e s ,  
payoffs, equilibria and stability are somewhat nebulous and not formally specified
3. Though these 
works succeed in portraying the game context and explaining the outcomes as strategic moves, the 
absence of explicit models pose restrictive limits to empirically substantiate hypothesis (Greif 
1997).  In  consequence,  the  empirical  usefulness  of  game  theory  remains  limited  and  the 
                                                 
2  Person  and  Tabellini  (2000)  and  Drazen  (2000)  introduce  political  economic  models  developed  by 
economists. For a general appraisal of these models see Saint-Paul (2000) and for a critical review of interest-
group models see Mitchell and Munger (1991). 
3 Political scientists have a wide range starting from mathematical formalization to traditional narrative. 
Referring to economic historians working with game theory, Greif (1997) distinguishes between two groups: 
“ g e n e r a l   i n s i g h t s ”   s t u d i e s   a n d   c o n t e x t -specific models. The latter group tries to provide micro-fundamentals 
to analyze a case. See Kantor and Fishback (1994) and Kantor (1995) for analysis on coalitions and 
institutional innovation belonging to the general insights group.   
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understanding  of  strategic  interactions  is  either  non-robust  or  appears  governed  by  wild, 
idiosyncratic elements.  
 
The Literature on Economic Reform  
 
The literature on economic reform is paradigmatic in illustrating the achievements but also the 
weaknesses at filling the gap between general game theory and study cases in analyzing institutional 
change
4.  Because  of  the  extension  of  this  research  agenda  a  comment  about  the  studies  it 
comprehends should be made at this point. Market -oriented reform arose as an issue in several 
cou n t r i e s   o v e r   t h e   m i d   1 9 7 0 ‟ s .   T h e   w e l f a r e   s t a t e   c a m e   i n t o   c r i s i s   a n d   t h e   p e r s p e c t i v e   o f   a   g l o b a l  
market encouraged an alternative regime where the free market ideology gained terrain. The initial 
studies  were  policy-oriented  and  intended  to  shed  light  on  economic  policy  design  and 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n   ( D o r n b u s c h   1 9 9 3 ) .   T h e   “ f i r s t   g e n e r a t i o n   r e f o r m s ”   i n v o l v e d   c h a n g e s   i n   e c o n o m i c  
policies for trade liberalization, fiscal adjustment, elimination of exchange controls, deregulation 
and privatization (Williamson 1994a). O v e r   t h e   1 9 9 0 ‟ s ,   t h e   “ s e c o n d   g e n e r a t i o n   r e f o r m s ”   m o v e d  
beyond  pure  economic  issues  to  institutional  redesign  of  the  state,  labor  markets,  and  social 
security. While the first generation emphasized macroeconomic stability, the second generation 
focused on the institutional structure needed to foster economic efficiency and growth (Krueger 
2000a). The political and technical difficulties brought about by this generation led scholars to 
openly tackle the strategic issues of the transitions toward market economies and, in many cases, 
toward democracy.  
 
The  recent  research  on  economic  reform  has  drawn  upon  game  theory  to  discern  how 
economics and politics interrelate. This direction is not more that the convergence toward what has 
been called the modern or new political economy; the rational choice approach is at its base along 
with the notion of strategic interactions taking place in particular settings. The specification of 
c o l l e c t i v e   a c t o r s ,   t h e i r   g o a l s   a n d   p o l i c y ‟ s   p r e f e r e n c e s   i s   o n e   o f   t h e   m a i n   c o m p o n e n t s   o f the analysis. 
Also, the picture of governmental and economic institutions helps to capture the initial stage, where 
collective  actors  are  embedded,  and  the  incentives  they  face  to  eventually  work  against  that 
prevailing  institutional  structure  (Sturzenegger  and  Tommasi  1998,  1-9;  Frieden  2000,  37-43). 
Insofar as a reform entails changes in the rules, it is conceptualized as a change in the political and 
economic equilibrium. Specifically, a reform brings about distributional conflicts: first because the 
reform will contingently create and destroy rents thereby defining potential losers and winners, and 
second because powerful groups might influence public policies (subsidies, tariffs, etc) whereby 
they protect themselves but also may engage in rent-seeking activities.  
 
This paper focuses on the interplay of economic and political actors deciding the general rules 
to drive the economy; that is how decisive players jointly choose a developmental strategy. The 
latter  refers  to  the  decision-making  of  domestic  actors  and  governments  aimed  at  increasing 
economic growth and improving general social welfare. Therein lays the substantive importance of 
the question on why the economic reforms are or not adopted. Such adoption of these policies 
means a choice of policies that will affect the present and future collective welfare. Other important 
questions about the way to implement reforms or the social benefits and costs they might entail are 
not addressed here.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Sturzenegger and Tommasi (1998) collect models of economic reforms developed by economists. Efforts 
led by political scientists remain less formal and varied; see Waterbury (1989), Geddes (1991), and Williams 
(2001). An appraisal of the literature is provided by Haggard (2000).  
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Actors and Strategies 
 
Beyond these general insights, the research on political economy is struggling to deal with the 
challenges of integrating theoretical models with empirical work in a robust way. A first step to 
address the complexity of the real world through the abstraction of models is to explicitly identify 
the complications of the reality and the limits of the researcher. A game theory model is a tool to 
simplify the choices involved in strategic events that actors face. The goal is to find a coherent and 
p a r s i m o n i o u s   e x p l a n a t i o n   o f   h o w   p l a y e r s ‟   d e c isions translate into observable outcomes.  In doing 
so, the required assumptions indicate the scope and strength of the model in view of competing 
m o d e l s .   M o d e l i n g   e n t a i l s   “ w h a t   c h o i c e s   w e   b e l i e v e   t h e   a c t o r s   s e e   i n   t h e   d e s i g n   o f   t h e   g a m e ,   w h a t  
they  understand  about  their  choices,  what  consequences  they  believe  can  follow  from  their 
d e c i s i o n s ,   a n d   h o w   t o   e v a l u a t e   t h o s e   c o n s e q u e n c e s ”   ( M o r r o w   1 9 9 4 ,   5 7 ) .   T h e r e f o r e ,   t h e   e x p l a n a t o r y  
power of a model lies on its ability to capture how players perceive and evaluate a specific strategic 
situation.  
 
S u c h   e v a l u a t i o n s   a r e   i n s c r i b e d   o n   p l a y e r s ‟   o w n   v a l u e   s y s t e m ,   w h i c h ,   i n   g e n e r a l ,   i s   a s s u m e d   t o  
follow a consistent calculus of benefits and costs given the information that players posses. This is 
at the very heart of the rational choice approach
5. What it is not so well understood is that such 
assessment of profits and losses is historically determined either by formal institutions constraining 
behavior or by cumulative knowledge and expectations players have about their  own society. 
J u d g m e n t s   o n   p l a y e r s ‟   m o t i v a t i o n s   a n d   a c t i o n s   a r e   c h a l l e n g i n g   t o   e x t e r n a l   o b s e r v e r s   b e c a u s e   t h e  
observers  carry  their  own  value  system  and  are  not  able  to  wholly  perceive  what  the  players 
perceive. While players face an ex-ante situation, observers look at the ex-post results. The gap 
c o u l d   b e   c l o s e d   b y   a n   i m m e r s i o n   o f   t h e   o b s e r v e r   i n t o   p l a y e r s ‟   s c e n a r i o .   T h i s   i s   t h e   w a y   h i s t o r i a n s  
and  other  social  scientists  approach  historical  episodes.  Developing  knowledge  about  the 
institutional  structure  and  the  mind-set  of  actors  is  labor  intensive  and  time-consuming.  The 
discernment of several informational sources is also needed; Even if statistics speed the process of 
getting a picture on the dynamic of some variables, the observer has to spend time with qualitative 
m a t e r i a l .   T h e   a p p l i c a t i o n   o f   t h e o r e t i c a l   n o t i o n s   s h a r p e n s   t h e   o b s e r v e r ‟ s   p e r c e p t i o n ,   a s s i s t i n g  
him/her in discriminating, organizing and making sense of the gathered information. When theory 
and facts harmonize, causal connections are discovered and the explanation is robust
6.     
 
Having said this, the model that develops in the next section is one possible reading on what the 
e c o n o m i c   r e f o r m s   c o u l d   h a v e   m e a n t   t o   t h e   a c t o r s   i n   1 9 7 0 ‟ s   C o l o m b i a .   I t   i s   a   g a m e   w h e r e b y   t h r e e  
players,  Government,  Coffee  and  Industry,  decide  on  the  adoption  of  economic  reforms.  This 
s t r u c t u r e ,   a s   M a r e s   ( 1 9 8 5 ,   6 6 9 )   s u g g e s t s ,   i m p l i e s   a   s e l e c t i o n   o f   f i r s t ,   “ w h o   d e f i n e s   t h e   l i m i t s   o f  
c h o i c e ”   a n d   s e c o n d ,   “ w h o   m a k e s   d e c i s i o n   o n   t h o s e   l i m i t s . ”   T h e   l i m i t   o f   c h o i c e s   r e f e r s   t o  the set of 
possibilities of specific policies given by the political and economic constraints of the international 
and  domestic  scenario.  For  example,  a  country  like  Colombia  could  not  have  a  communist 
government because of the ongoing geopolitics amidst the Cold War, nor could it attract foreign 
investment  to  sectors  where  the  comparative  advantage  was  null.  The  set  of  possibilities  is 
i n c o r p o r a t e d   i n t o   t h e   m o d e l   b y   p l a y e r s ‟   i n t e r p r e t a t i o n   o f   t h e   e c o n o m i c   r e f o r m s   a n d   t h e   e x t e n t   t o  
which they can be carried over.  This set ultimately reflects the underlying institutional structure 
u p o n   w h i c h   e v e r y   p l a y e r ‟ s   a c t i o n s   r e s t .   S u c h   s t r u c t u r e   c o m p r i s e s   t h e   e c o n o m i c   s t r u c t u r e ,   t h e  
political institutions and the available policy instruments. Second, the identity of the players shows 
                                                 
5 For an insightful discussion on what means and what does not mean the rational choice in political science 
see Tsebelis (1990) chapter 2 and Calvert (1995).  
6 Riker and Weimer (1995, 88) are particularly concerned about developing a more sophisticated appreciation 
of the role of institutions. But building theory, given the enormous importance of the context which is shaping 
institutions, demands specialization and broad training that one single scholar cannot undertake.    
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a specific relation between the state (or governmental actors) and the society. In this case, it is 
a r g u e d   t h a t   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   c h o i c e s   a r e   d o m i n a t e d   b y   t h e   m a i n   e c o n o m i c   s e c t o r s ‟   d e m a n d s   ( i n t e r e s t -
group  approach).  Indeed,  the  Colombian  instit u t i o n a l   s t r u c t u r e   r e v e a l s   t h e   e l i t e s ‟   a b i l i t y   t o  
marginalize non-elite actors. Excluding other collective actors as workers or peasants from the 
game means these actors did not have direct leverage in the decisions on the economic reforms. It 
does not mean, however, that their actions and reactions related to the reform did not affect the 
process.  In addition, it is observed that the state also had some degree of autonomy to eventually 
d e f y   t h e   d o m i n a n t   g r o u p s .   T h i s   i s   p i c t u r e d   b y   G o v e r n m e n t s ‟   p r e f e r e n c e   for full reforms over half 
reforms and its decision of undertaking political openness simultaneously. Likewise, the use of 
temporary extra-constitutional mechanisms to rule and enact controversial measures signals some 
degree of state autonomy.    
 
 
Multi-dimensionality, Multiple Arenas, Risk and Uncertainty 
 
 
Modeling  a  game  on  the  adoption  of  economic  reform  poses  other  challenges.  First,  an 
economic reform is a bundle of policies in which every component can be considered as continuous 
variables whose levels players must decide (e.g. 5% of annual inflation, 3% of budget deficit (% 
GDP) and 10% increase in income tax). Players have a multidimensional problem in which the 
nature of their preferences (circular, separable, non-separable) along with the legislature structure 
(parliamentary and voting procedures) defines how players come to a solution (Johnson 1998, 60-
96). Second, because the reforms alter the economic as much as the political equilibrium both 
c h a n g e s   e n t e r   i n t o   p l a y e r s ‟   c a l c u l a t i o n s .   P l a y e r s   a re involved not only in one game where economic 
benefits are at stake but also in another game on political leverage. This means players are engaged 
in a net of games in which each issue is played in a particular arena. The principal arena is the one 
the  ob s e r v e r   f o c u s e s   o n .   I n   g a m e s   i n v o l v i n g   m u l t i p l e   a r e n a s ,   o r   n e s t e d   g a m e s ,   “ t h e   s i t u a t i o n  
p r e v a i l i n g   i n   o t h e r   a r e n a s   d e t e r m i n e s   t h e   p a y o f f s   o f   t h e   p l a y e r s   i n   t h e   p r i n c i p a l   a r e n a . ”   ( T s e b e l i s  
1990,  58). This  brings  about  varying  payoffs  associated  with  a  nested  game.    For the  sake  of 
analytical tractability, one arena has to be chosen, but the presence of nested games forces the 
observer to pay attention to the context and refer to exogenous factors whereby he/she can identify 
t h e   s o u r c e   o f   p a y o f f s ‟   v a r i a b i l i t y
7. Third, assessing the reform costs and benefits demands that 
players consider risks (known probabilities) and uncertainties (unknown probabilities). Some of the 
risks can come from redistributional effects and contingent policies, while the uncertainties could 
arise  from  systemic  shocks.  How  players  manage  these  issues  and  form  their  expectations 
determines how they evaluate the outcomes and hence order their preferences.  
In dealing with these three complexities, the model explicitly sets some departure points. First, 
m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l i t y   i s   i n c l u d e d   t h r o u g h   p l a y e r s ‟   d i s t i n c t i o n s   b e t w e e n   t w o   l e v e l s   o f   r e f o r m :   f u l l   o r  
high and half or low. They also differentiate between two components: the stabilization bundle and 
the structural reform bundle. These distinctions introduce some combinations in the reform package 
a s   w e l l   a s   p l a y e r s ‟   p r e f e r e n c e s   a b o u t   t h e m .   S e c o n d ,   t h e   f o c u s   l i e s   o n   t h e   e c o n o m i c   a r e n a ,   w h i c h  
means that political institutions are not modeled and only relevant economic institutions enter into 
the account. Consequently, the payoffs are specified by economic variables, although it is wise to 
keep in mind that games in other arenas might change the payoffs in the economic arena. This 
context-specific model offers an incomplete picture in this regard
8.   
                                                 
7 Tsebelis offers an insightful discussion about the existence of subgames like the separability of games from 
contextual factors (1990, 61).  
8 Haggard (2000, 36) points out that an analysis of how economic decisions are constrained by democratic 
institutions is still needed.  Considering only one policy at time may bring more integrated results, although 




Third, it is assumed that players are able to evaluate the risks such that they have expectations 
on the benefits and costs from reforms. Though, the model does not provide foundations to show 
how such expectations are structured; two basic ideas are behind. Firstly, expectations are based on 
prior  beliefs  that  are  updated  after  receiving  new  information  through  subjective  conditional 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s .   A   p r i o r   b e l i e f   r e f e r s   t o   “ t h e   s u b j e c t i v e   p r o b a b i l i t y   o f   e a c h   p o s s i b l e   s t a t e   o f   t h e   w o r l d  
before the cons i d e r a t i o n   o f   n e w   i n f o r m a t i o n ”   M o r r o w   ( 1 9 9 4 ,   3 5 2 ) .   T h i s   p r o c e s s   g e n e r a t e s   B a y e s i a n  
expectations  that  players  use  to  evaluate  expected  payoffs  from  reforms.  Secondly,  subjective 
evaluation  is  driven  by  the  observational  fact  that  individuals  value  gains  and  losses  from  a 
reference  point,  which  is  the  status  quo.  Hence,  individuals  have  a  limited  foresight  and  are 
immersed amid incomplete future markets, which lead them to place more weight on present than 
on future gains. However, here there is no assumption about risk-aversion attitudes
9. The picture is 
different as to uncertainties because players are not of the capacity to form such Bayesian 
e x p e c t a t i o n s .   T h e   e v e n t   i s   c o m p l e t e l y   u n f o r e s e e a b l e .   I n   t h i s   c a s e ,   t h e   p l a y e r s ‟   p a y o f f s   c h a n g e  
depends  on  the  effect  o f   t h e   s h o c k   o n   p l a y e r s ‟   i n t e r e s t s   a n d   s t r a t e g i c   i n t e r a c t i o n .   T h e   m o d e l  
includes an international shock in the Coffee international prices which redefines the game. Since 
“ t h e   i n t e r n a t i o n a l   s y s t e m   c o u l d   s h r i n k   o r   e x p a n d   t h e   r a n g e   o f   p o l i c y   o p t i o n s ”   ( M a r e s  1985, 697), 
the reference points for players are substantially altered. To what extent players rightly and quickly 
identify such a change, given their limited foresight, is an issue that future research could answer
10.   
 
 
Preferences and rules of decision 
 
 
T h e   f i r s t   s t e p   t o   m o d e l   p l a y e r s ‟   p r e f e r e n c e s   i s   t o   d e f i n e   f u n c t i o n s   i n d i c a t i n g   t h e i r   e x p e c t e d   n e t  
g a i n s .   S e c t o r s ‟   n e t   g a i n s   f u n c t i o n s   h a v e   a s   d e p e n d e n t   v a r i a b l e s   r e a l   p r o f i t s ,   i n p u t   p r i c e s ,   t a x e s   a n d  
s u b s i d i e s .   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   f u n c t i o n s   i n c l u d e   t h e   e x p e c t e d   p r o f i t s   o f   s e c t o r s ,   w o r k e r s ‟   i n c o m e   a n d   a  
p a r a m e t e r   f o r   o p p o r t u n i s t i c   g a i n s   ( e . g .   c o r r u p t i o n ) .   T h e   c e n t r a l   v a r i a b l e   l i n k i n g   p l a y e r s ‟   d e c i s i o n s   i s  
the level of inflation. In addition, other economic policy instruments such as the nominal exchange 
rate, income taxes, and capital subsidies are considered. Translating general functions of expected 
net gains into ordinal payoffs has been possible through the use of rules of decisions. A rule of 
decision indicates how a player ranks a set of discrete strategies and it is based on a heuristic 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n   o f   e v e r y   p l a y e r ‟ s   i n t e r e s t s
11. The heuristic interpretation possesses a historical and a 
t h e o r e t i c a l   c o m p o n e n t   t h a t   w o r k   i n t e r a c t i v e l y   s o   a s   t o   p r o d u c e   a   c o h e r e n t   r e a d i n g   o f   p l a y e r s ‟  
behavior. The theoretical components are the two simple one-shot games known as the assurance 
g a m e   a n d   t h e   p r i s o n e r s ‟   d i l e m m a .     T h e s e   g a m e s   f r a m e   t h e   i n t e r a c t i o n   b e t w e e n   e c o n o m i c   s e c t o r s ,  
                                                                                                                                                     
(1991) develops a game theory model to explain legislative outcomes of the administrative reform in some 
Latin American Democracies during 1950-1980. Despite of the complexity of social systems, institutions 
create spheres of social interaction with less or more interdependence whereby the connections among sub-
systems are limited.  
9 Some scholars have pointed out that individuals tend to weigh more heavily losses than gains. This 
observation comes from Prospect Theory which is a much more complicated alternative to the classic utility 
theory. Morrow (1994, 48), Weimer and Vining (1999, 125).  
10 Consider for example the fatal mistakes policymakers and governments made during the Great Depression 
(Temin 1989) or during the 1980s debt crisis in Latin America (Bulmer-Thomas 1994). The strong statement 
of rational expectations as it is understood in economics failed since individuals do not have the right model 
to understand the economy.   
11 This is an alternative way to approach utility functions. Mares (1988) develops decision rules to explain 
when a middle country would decide whether or not to challenge the regional hegemon. He provides 
h i s t o r i c a l   e v i d e n c e   t h r o u g h   t h e   M e x i c a n   a n d   B r a z i l i a n   c a s e s   d u r i n g   t h e   1 9 4 0 ‟ s   a n d   1 9 6 0 ‟ s .     
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providing a guide to the benefit-cost analysis they must be doing. Another theoretical component is 
the  notion  of  coalition  in  which  Government  plays  as  an  agenda-setter.  Government  could 
manipulate  the  agenda  and  reformulate  its  proposals  to  gather  support.  Based  on  this  power, 
Government may change the reference points to players and give room for coalitional behavior. The 
historical component provides the evidence to validate these theoretical guidelines.  
 
It is also assumed that players reveal their preferences through observable actions. For example, 
when a player can afford to pay a higher tax but chooses not to, then it is clear that the player 
prefers a low tax. The extraction of such information requires caution because it demands that the 
o b s e r v e r   j u d g e   p l a y e r s ‟   c a p a c i t i e s ,   t h e   t r u t h f u l n e s s   o f   t h e i r   a c t i o n s   a n d   t h e i r   c o m m i t m e n t   t o   t h e i r  
decisions. Although economic theory is a powerful guide to ground initial conjectures, only a rich 
r e a d i n g   o f   t h e i r   c o n t e x t   c a n   r e n d e r   a n   a p p r o x i m a t e   s e n s e   o f   p l a y e r s ‟   c o n s t r a i n t s   a n d   m o t i v a t i o n s .   I n  





    
Another  central  feature  of  a  game  theory  model  is  time  and  dynamics.  This is  about  how 
p l a y e r s ‟   i n t e r a c t i o n s   e v o l v e   t h r o u g h   t i m e   a n d   i n t r o d u c e   i n s t i t u t i o n a l   i n n o v a t i o n s .   I n   t h e   f r a m e w o r k  
of  rational  choice  theory,  social  interactions,  in  this  case  economic  reform  adoption  and 
implementation, may be seen as repeated games. The initial outcome of the first game determines 
the next stage and this goes on successively. In turn, players accumulate information and update 
their  beliefs  and  assessments.  An  endogenous  selection  of  policies  and  institutions  takes  place 
throughout  this  iterative  process.  Haggard  and  Kaufman,  in  analyzing  transitions  to  market 
e c o n o m i e s   a n d   d e m o c r a t i c   r e g i m e s ,   p o i n t   o u t   t h a t   “ p o l i t ical and economic developments during the 
first two or three governments constitute the first links in a longer causal chain that connects the 
i n i t i a l   t r a n s i t i o n   t o   t h e   e l u s i v e   “ l o n g   r u n ”   ( H a g g a r d   a n d   K a u f f m a n   1 9 9 7 ,   2 2 7 -279).  Economic 
reforms are inherently path-d e p e n d e n t   b e c a u s e   t h e y   a r e   “ p r o c e s s e s   i n   w h i c h   t h e   l o n g -run character 
of the system depends critically on the history of the system - that is, on the specific sequence of 
e v e n t s ,   s o m e   o f   w h i c h   m a y   b e   r a n d o m   i n   n a t u r e ”   ( G u i n n a n e   2 0 0 4 ,   2 ) .   H e r e   i t   i s   developed a one-
period game to capture the initial stage of the iterative sequence of games. Players decide whether 
or not to undertake the economic reforms in this initial game. While the historical time in which this 





  The ultimate goal is to offer an analytical explanation about the historical result. The basic 
notion of Nash equilibrium provides an initial insight. However, it lacks explanatory power because 
it does not coincide with the historical result. Then, the notion of coalition turns out to be useful and 
the explanation moves from non-cooperative to cooperative games. It is argued that players also 
have  a  limited  perception  of  feasible  coalitions.  Multiple  equilibria  emerge  and  a  historical 
assessment indicates which coalitions are more likely. This line of reasoning drives me to finally 
p i n p o i n t   t h e   g a m e ‟ s   o u t c o m e .    
 
                                                 
12 The principle of revealed preference builds the bridge between unobservable utility functions and 
observable demand functions (Nicholson, 2005, 150). I use the same notion for linking unobservable 
s u b j e c t i v e   c a l c u l a t i o n s   o f   m u l t i p l e   v a r i a b l e s   u n d e r   r i s k   t o   i n f e r e n c e s   a b o u t   p l a y e r s ‟   b e h a v i o r .     
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A final comment on the notion of coalitions which pervaded the literature on economic reforms is 
made now. Scholars have used this notion as part of the picture of institutional change. The basic 
idea is that individuals need to establish enforceable alliances for none of them acting on his/her 
own has the strength to transform the status quo. However, most of the study cases use a blurred 
n o t i o n   o f   c o a l i t i o n   w i t h o u t   s p e c i f y i n g   a c t o r s ‟   p r e f e r e n c e s ,   p a y o f f s   a n d   s u p p o r t i v e   i n s t i t u t i o n s .   I n  
t h o s e   s t u d i e s ,   t h e   c o a l i t i o n   i s   i n t r o d u c e d   a s   t h e   o b s e r v a t i o n   o f   p l a y e r s ‟   a c q u i e s c e n c e   t o   a   s e t   o f 
actions  or  through  the  evidence  of  side  payments.  Here  game  theory  is  used  as  a  posteriori 
description of events without analytical predictability that undermines, and in some cases obscures, 
the analytical power of the concept (Mares 1988, 457). A Coalition at its very heart must have the 
following  components:  individual  and  collective  rationality  (or  to  put  it  simply  profitability), 
enforceability and credible intra-coalitional compensation mechanisms.  In the absence of explicit 
specifications  of  player s ‟   m o t i v a t i o n s   a n d   s t r a t e g i e s   t h e r e   w i l l   a l w a y s   b e   s e v e r a l   p r o b l e m s   o f  
identification. The first problem has to do with discerning when players are truly attracted by the 
coalition and when they are complying temporally with the coalition because they have hidden 
agendas (Stiglitz 2000). The second problem refers to the stability of the coalition, which could be 
f r a g i l e   o r   s t r o n g   d e p e n d i n g   o n   p l a y e r s ‟   a s s e s s m e n t   o f   p r o s p e c t i v e   n e t   g a i n s   a n d   t h e   i n s t i t u t i o n s  
enforcing these expectations. Ultimately, although profitability and enforcement are at large extent 
endogenous variables throughout the institutional transformation, the initial setting of the coalition 
is decisive for its scope. Overcoming theoretical looseness in the analysis of coalitions narrows 




III.  The Colombian case 
 
The International Context 
 
U n d e r s t a n d i n g   t h e   m e a n i n g   o f   t h e   r e f o r m s   i n   t h e   1 9 7 0 ‟ s   C o l o m b i a   r e q u i r e s   t h e  
consideration of two major facts taking place throughout the region. First, the Cold War demanded 
from third world countries unambiguous political alignments. Many countries in Latin America saw 
how military regimes took over the governments with the goal of fighting communist threats. U.S. 
military training programs taught officers from Argentina, Chile, and Brazil among others (Clayton 
and Conniff 1999, 497). Particularly in Colombia, although there was no dictatorship, the civilian 
governments also received this help to fight against the existing communist insurgency. But the 
cooperation between Latin American governments and the U.S. raised internal opposition and was 
seen as a menace to sovereignty. This sentiment was reinforced after the military coup in 1973 
Chile, when the U.S. was involved with the fall of Allend e ‟ s   s o c i a l i s t   g o v e r n m e n t .     S e c o n d ,   t h e  
economic nationalism in the region was rooted since the Second World War as a response to the 
little  trade  opportunities  the  region  had  with  developed  countries (Bulmer-Thomas  1994,  263). 
D u r i n g   t h e   1 9 6 0 ‟ s   t h e   t r a d e   protection of developed countries to their agricultural and manufactured 
goods led Latin America to deem regional trade integration as the opportunity to give new life to 
industrialization.  
                                                 
13 The hypotheses on the political economy of market oriented reforms illustrate these identification problems. 
One hypothesis states that since broad coalitions are fragile and may break easily, the reforms must be quickly 
furthered before the coalition disappears. Another hypothesis states that as time passes, agents regroup as the 
r e s u l t   o f   a d v e r s e   c h a n g e s   i n   t h e   e c o n o m y .   T h e s e   h y p o t h e s e s ‟   u s e f u l n e s s   c o m e s   d o w n   t o   t h e   n a t u r e   o f   t h e  
coalition and the effect of shocks. The looseness around the concept obscures the analysis instead of 
illuminating it. Needless to say, to formally identify a coalition has substantive implications for economic 




These  two  facts,  the  tense  political  relationship  with  the  U.S.  as  well  as  economic 
n a t i o n a l i s m ,   s h a p e d   L a t i n   A m e r i c a ‟ s   a t t i t u d e   t o w a r d   t h e   g l o b a l   m a r k e t   i n   t h e   1 9 7 0 ‟ s .   O n   o n e   h a n d ,  
the region needed to improve its trade balance and foreign investment, but on the other hand, it 
sought  to  protect  its  industrial  base  and  defend  its  sovereignty.  These  objectives,  sometimes 
opposing, required careful governmental actions so as to serve national economic interests, comply 
with international order and control internal political contentions. 
 
The Colombian Economy  
 
In 1970, Colombia had a population of twenty two million and its per-capita income ranked 
fourteen  among  the  twenty  Latin  American  Countries.  In  South  America,  its  GDP  per  capita 
economy was placed beneath only Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, Mexico and Peru, and was very 
close to Brazil. During the 1960´s, the country had displayed an annual growth rate of 5.2% -which 
was also the regional average- thus reflecting the advance of industrialization (Bulmer-Thomas 
1994, 309).  The agricultural sector produced 25% of the total GDP while the industry accounted 
for 21%. By 1978, 35.2% of the population worked in the primary sector while 22% and 42.5% 
worked in industry and services respectively (Ocampo 1996, 247). Exports accounted for 14% of 
the GDP, with Coffee being the mai n   p r o d u c t ,   c o n t r i b u t i n g   a p p r o x i m a t e l y   6 5 %   o f   t h e   c o u n t r y ‟ s  
total exports (World Bank 2003). However, fluctuations in the Coffee international market induced 
a cyclical character in the economy. Imports reached 16% of the GDP; intermediate goods were 
51%  of  total  imports  while  capital  goods  were  38%  (Ocampo  1996,  253).  The  major  trading 
partners were Venezuela and the U.S.  
 
The Economic Policy Regime 
 
A visible role in the international coffee market and a state-lead developmental strategy 
shaped the economy by 1970.  Since the Second World War, inward-looking development had 
consolidated through the import-substituting industrialization model (ISI). Under this model the 
country expanded its industrial base by increasing trade barriers and regulating capital markets so as 
to provide favorable conditions to domestic industrial firms. The model operated through multiple 
trade tariffs and exchange rates, import quotas and licenses, differential taxes, banking legislation 
and investment regulation, among others  instruments. Coffee was the main provider of foreign 
currency, but coffee prices fluctuated according to the swings of the international market, bringing 
instability.  First,  the  provision  of  international  reserves  was  irregular,  restricting  capital  goods 
imports. Second, the exchange rate widely fluctuated, hindering the control of inflation and the 
balance of payments. The previous decades to 1970 were a period for learning how to deal with the 
external cycles. The crawling peg regimen adopted in 1967 gave stability to the exchange rate and 
reduced the volatility of inflation
14. In addition, new monetary mechanisms to prevent inflation 
from extraordinary coffee export revenues, such as the issue of special assets (TAC or coffee saving 
assets), were created. Consequently, Coffee had a dominant role in macroeconomic policymaking. 
 
                                                 
14 The crawling peg  – a system of small but daily increases in the  nominal exchange  rate and a  foreign 
exchange market controlled by the government- was a mechanism to reduce monetary instability that came 
from exchange currency crisis caused by the flexible exchange rate regime. To some degree, the crawling peg 
lessened the transmission channel between external shocks and the domestic economy. Kalmanovitz (1997, 
chapter VIII). See Graph 7 in appendix 1.  
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By  1970,  the  growth,  achieved  by  substituting  nondurable and  some  durable  consumer 
goods,  had  exhausted.  The  manufacturing  sector  lacked  competitiveness  in  terms  of  price  and 
quality partly because of the protection from international competition and the price distortions. The 
trade barriers and capital market restrictions at this stage began to be seen as major obstacles to 
further industrialization, manufactured exports and sustained economic growth. Also, they were 
seen  as  responsible  for  the  macroeconomic  instability,  which  was  perceived  through  volatile 
inflation,  fiscal  deficits,  and  recurrent  balance-of-payment  problems.  Although  Colombia  had 
finally come to a solution to the recurrent volatility of the exchange rate with the adoption of a 
crawling peg system in 1967, major inflationary threats were still stemming from the interweaving 
of fiscal and monetary policies amid a policy regime prone to developmental credit. Such a regime 
included  international  credits  borrowed  by  the  government  not  only  for  public  expenditure  on 
infrastructure but also for private firms, mixed companies and state owned enterprises (SOEs).  Soft 
loans for private firms were central incentives to private investment as well (Bulmer-Thomas 1994, 
350)
15. The following table summarizes the economic policy regime. 
 
Table 1 
The 1970´s Economic Policy Regime in Colombia 
Policy Instruments  Characteristics 
Fiscal 
 
Public Expenditure  ) (,  ) (  
Taxes  ) ( 
Internal and External 
Indebtedness  
-Public investment in SOEs 
-Shallow internal capital market for public debt. 
-Severely constrained in regard to taxes  
Monetary 
 
Money Issuing (M) 
Interest rate ( r)  
-Monetary board which included the minister of 
f i n a n c e   a n d   p r i v a t e   s e c t o r s ‟   r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  
-Developmental credit (monetary policy and 
credit regulation were tied). 
-Dependent on fiscal decisions  
-Responsible for the exchange rate defense  
- Differential interest rates according to economic 
activity and forced investments.  
External  
 
Crawling Peg (e) 
Trade Protection (Tariffs 
and quantitative restrictions)   
Capital flows regulation (r ) 
-Fixed exchange rate (continuous 
microdevaluations) 
-Pervasive protection to agriculture and main 
industrial sectors. 
- Tight financial controls and shallow capital 





The Political Scenario 
 
Alfonso  Lopez  M.  won the  presidential  elections  based  on a  wide  support from  labor  and 
capital. This government gathered such a support by offering a political and economic openness.  
Lopez had led the MRL (Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal), the extremist wing of the liberal 
party, which criticized the lack of democracy brought by the coalitional government that had ruled 
                                                 
15 This trend was present in several Latin American economies. As a result, the size of the state grew in many 
countries. Ocampo (1996, 302).   
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since 1958. Lopez declared himself as leading a left-center government, thereby receiving as many 
votes from privilege classes as from popular sectors (Lopez 1975a, Gomez 1978; Pécaut 1988).   
 
The dual aperture certainly found fertile terrain. If it succeeded the political gains would be 
enormous. The alliance between liberals and conservatives, the Frente Nacional, though useful as a 
solution to the violence unleashed after 1950, had modest success in addressing social demands. It 
consolidated a moderate way of making politics, far from the neo-liberal or socialist extremes that 
severely limited the scope of economic and political reforms (Silva 1989a, 1989b; Hartlyn 1993). 
Little advance was accomplished as far as the land and tax reform was concerned, which were 
aimed at improving the income distribution. Governmental actions addressed to distribute land, 
i m p r o v e   w o r k e r s ‟   s t a n d a r d   o f   l i f e   a n d   f i g h t   u n e m p l o y m e n t   w e r e   i n i t i a l l y   u n d e r t a k e n ,   b u t   a f t e r   s o m e  
time were blocked or amended in the political houses.   
 
However, up to that time the Colombian governments had rested on a small state autonomy 
insofar that the state had a low relative independency for opposing the main interest groups. After 
1950,  a  corporatist  nature  of  the  state  developed  when  economic  intervention  became  more 
pronounced and several associations of producers thrived in order to channel their demands into the 
state. By 1970 there were 81 associations of producers; however the most important associations 
amounted to no more than five, representing coffee and agricultural sectors, industry, commerce 
and  banking
16. Leaders from all these organizations were appointed in official positions as a 
mechanism to reach consensual policies. Furthermore, a net of official institutions like  councils, 
commissions, and directed boards of decentralized state organizations relied on the participation of 
t h e s e   a s s o c i a t i o n s ‟   m e m b e r s .   I n   1 9 8 1 ,   i t   w a s   e s t i m a t e d   t h a t   5 4 %   o f   t h e   o f f i c i a l s   w o r k i n g   w i t h   s t a t e  
organizations were representatives from the private sector. They were in charge of designing global 
and sector economic policies (Ocampo 1996, 320).   
 
Advancing collective objectives would mainly require extraordinary mechanisms to legislate so 
as to conceal broad faculties to the executive. Nonetheless, once these special periods ended, the 
measures could be changed through the usual channels in hands of the interest groups
17. A sign of 
such low state autonomy could be found in the tax structure. The tax effort was low and attempts to 
increase income taxes repeatedly failed. This indicates the reluctance of the economic sectors to 
substitute external debt revenue and monetary expansion for direct taxes as a main source of 
government expenditure (Pécaut 1988, 75).    
 
Y e t ,   t h e   1 9 7 0 ‟ s   w e r e   a   p e r i o d   o f   m anagement innovations to the Colombian state. New 
formal  institutions  and  technocrats  began  to  integrate  the  state  staff  of  high  officials.  This 
“ t e c h n o c r a t i z a t i o n ”   w a s   c l e a r l y   p e r c e i v e d   i n   L o p e z ‟   g o v e r n m e n t ,   w h o s e   r h e t o r i c   a n d   p o l i c y m a k i n g  
was  supported  by  a  technocratic  team  as  well  as  intense  international  diplomatic  activity. 
Outstanding and respected economists such as Miguel Urrutia, Ph. D. at Harvard, would lead the 
technocracy. The campaign and the first year of government included widely-known speeches and 
legislative actions whose main purpose was to persuade economic groups about the benefits of a 
                                                 
16 Urrutia (1983, 27). The main associations were: ANDI (Asociacion Nacional de Industriales) for industry; 
FEDECAFE (Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros) for Coffee; SAC (Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia) 
for Rural landowners and producers; FENALCO (Federacion Nacional de Comerciantes) for commerce; 
ASOBANCARIA (Asociacion Bancaria) for Banks, and ANIF (Asociacion Nacional de Instituciones 
Financieras for other financial institutions. 
17 Saenz Rover (2002), whose analyses of the entrepreneurial groups and the economic policy in the 1940´s, 
provides evidence of the low autonomy of the Colombian state in that period. Pécaut points out the multiple 
n u m b e r   o f   e x c e p t i o n a l   l e g i s l a t i v e   p r o c e d u r e s   d u r i n g   L o p e z ‟ s   g o v e r n m e n t   a s   a   s i g n a l   o f   t h e   s t a t e ‟ s   w e a k n e s s  
(1988, 247-326). Lombart (2000, 87-9) comes to similar conclusions through his study on t h e   1 9 9 0 ‟ s   trade 
policy.   
 
15 
Hayecksian conception of the state and the importance of consensual price and income policies. 
Doubtlessly, this tendency strengthened the government as a political actor
18.  
 
However, the political openness was a delicate task to undertake for there were deleterious 
elements in the environment: a growing communist insurgency, a powerful association of Peasants 
(ANUC) asking for land reform, strong unions, civil discontentment due to rural and urban poverty, 
unemployment, an inefficient and corrupted public administration, and low quality of public 
utilities.  
 
The meaning of the Economic Reforms 
 
The  first  proposal  of  economic  reforms  emerged  in  the  scenario  abovementioned.  The 
reformist  winds  were  influenced  by  the  criticisms  to  the  welfare  state  and  Keynesian  policies 
c o m i n g   f r o m   t h e   U . S .   a n d   E n g l a n d ,   w h i c h   e x p e r i e n c e d   s t a g f l a t i o n   b y   t h e   e a r l y   7 0 ‟ s .   T h e   n e w  
approach to conduct national policies emphasized lesser state intervention, promotion of market 
efficiency,  macroeconomic  stability  and  trade  openness  (Williamson  1994a).  Also,  inflationary 
control was a priority in the new international monetary order in which the dollar became the 
standard. In Colombia, the presidential candidate Alfonso Lopez M. introduced these ideas to the 
1 9 7 4   e l e c t i o n s .   M i c h e l s e n   s o u g h t   t o   t r a n s f o r m   t h e   c o u n t r y   i n t o   “ t h e   J a p a n   o f   S o u t h   A m e r i c a ”   b y  
bringing  down  inflation  and  trade  barriers  as  well  as  by  reducing  the  public  transferences  to 
industry. He questioned the ISI strategy by pointing out its shortcomings and highlighting the fact 
that  only  by  encouraging  market  mechanisms  would  economic  performance  enhance  and  trade 
opportunities  enlarge.  Macroeconomic  stability,  regional  trade  integration  and  financial 
liberalization were the means to stimulate capital accumulation and exports. The way to achieve 
higher national income would be paved to extend economic progress and address social demands. 
By increasing direct tax revenues and lessening exemptions and subsidies granted to private capital, 
fiscal deficits would be eliminated and competitiveness would be encouraged (Gomez 1978, 90-4).  
 
This  rhetoric  was  appealing  in  a  moment  when  foreign  capital  inflow  was  promising, 
industrial   e x p o r t s   w e r e   b o o m i n g   a n d   I S I ‟ s   b o t t l e n e c k s   w e r e   t i g h t e n i n g   a   g r e a t   d e a l   ( G a r a y   1 9 9 8 ) .  
Certainly between 1968 and 1974, the country experienced a boom in manufactured exports and 
foreign investment. The economic sectors, although at different extents, expressed their enthusiasm 
for participating in the expansion that the international market was showing. Inflation volatility and 
fiscal deficits were seen as undesirable features that must be eliminated whereas financial and trade 
liberalization were seen as advantageous institutions to pursue (Kalmanovitz 1997, 452; Bejarano 
1985, 127). Consequently, Lopez M. was elected president in 1974.  
 
Chile was the paradigm to follow, where economic reforms sought to reduce economic state 
intervention, trade barriers, and capital markets restrictions. The monetarist agenda included tight 
control in money growth, the reduction of fiscal deficits and close surveillance of real exchange 
rates to avoid overvaluations. Fiscal deficits and devaluation were important as long as they affected 
the  expansion  or  contraction  of  the  money  stock.  Inflation  from  this  perspective  is  mainly  a 
monetary  phenomenon  and  it  is  explained  primarily  by  excessive  money  growth.  But  Lopez 
claimed to be structuralist instead of monetarist in fighting inflation signaling that inflation was a 
not  only  a  matter  of  monetary  expansion  but  also  of  excessive  subsidies  and  lack  of  market 
competition (Gomez 1978, 90). In Colombia, such an agenda was pursued with a non-independent 
                                                 
18 S i n c e   t h e   1 9 6 0 ‟ s ,   t h e   U . S .   g o v e r n m e n t   p r o v i d e d   t e c h n i c a l   a n d   e c o n o m i c   a s s i s t a n c e   t o   C o l o m b i a n  
g o v e r n m e n t s   t h r o u g h   i n t e r n a t i o n a l   m i s s i o n s   ( M u s g r a v e ‟ s ,   C u r r i e ‟ s ) .   T h e s e   m i ssions were aimed at diagnosing 
social and economic problems and proposing solutions and policies.  This reflected the influence that 
American policymakers had on their Colombian counterparts.  See Berry and Hellman (1980).   
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central bank and a very well entrenched regime of centrally planned public and private investment 
and price controls.  The financial reform did not openly attack the developmental credit system; 
instead  it  tried  to  structure  that  system  such  that  it  would  not  contradict  the  monetary  policy. 
Ultimately, the goal was to harmonize monetary discipline with financial freedom. (Bejarano 1985, 
135; Cabrera 1980). Thus, the Colombian objectives and methods in this regard were far from the 
ones implemented in Chile, where neoliberalism was intensively experienced. 
 
T h e   p l a u s i b i l i t y   o f   t h e   r e f o r m s   d e p e n d e d   o n   L o p e z ‟ s   a b i l i t y   t o   r e a c h   a g r e e m e n t s   w i t h   t h e  
interest groups on the new policies and institutions. Two levels of agreements are proposed in this 
paper: a high effort in which the reforms are fully pursued and a low effort in which the pain or 
costs are alleviated by undertaking a half-hearted version. The meaning of full and half reforms is 
shown  in  table  2.  Stabilization  and  structural  adjustment  are  treated  as  two  main  reform 
components. Th e   f i r s t   i n c l u d e s   i n f l a t i o n   a n d   t h e   b u d g e t   d e f i c i t ‟ s   t a r g e t s .   T h e   s e c o n d   c o m p r e h e n d s  
measures redefining state intervention and market incentives. It can be seen that under the full 
version  the  targeted  level  of  macroeconomic  stability  and  structural  change  seeks  higher 
macroeconomic discipline and more market mechanisms in operation. Issues such as tax income, 
direct  state  investment  and  price  controls,  the  most  controversial  variables  in  the  Colombian 
scenario, move in opposing directions according to the reform version, while the rest of variables 
move in the same direction. Financial liberalization and the downsizing of state bureaucracy found 




Table 2  













One digit  Two digit 
 
















Financial Liberalization  
 
Commitment to open 
markets 
Suspension of the 
commitment if needed.  
 
Trade Liberalization   
 
Substantial reduction in 
trade barriers for all 
industries 
Moderate reduction in trade 
barriers for main industries 
and higher reduction for 
raw materials, capital 
goods and minor industries. 
Income taxes   
 
Higher than the pre-1974 
level  
Lower than pre-1974 level. 
Direct state investment 
 
Lower than the pre-1974 
level 
At least the pre-1974 level.  
Price distortions (control 
prices, subsidies, tax 
exemptions)   
 
Reduction and Elimination 
of most controls.  
Moderate reduction and 
maintenance of the rest of 
controls. 
Downsizing of State 
Bureaucracy 
Maximum cutback   Moderate cutback 
                                                 
19 Although the financial liberal i z a t i o n   w a s   a p p r o v e d   b y   t h e   p r e v i o u s   g o v e r n m e n t ,   r i g h t   b e f o r e   L o p e z ‟ s  
possession, the liberalization came into practice and was negotiated and implemented under this presidency. 




   
 
The  trade  reform  heavily  hinged  on  regional  agreements,  which  established  substantial 
restr i c t i o n s   t o   f o r e i g n   i n v e s t m e n t ;   i t   r e f l e c t e d   L a t i n   A m e r i c a n   g o v e r n m e n t s ‟   e c o n o m i c   n a t i o n a l i s m .  
The Acuerdo de Cartagena, or Andean Pact, included the nationalization of foreign banks; at least 
51% of the capital should be national capital and restricted foreign investment in other sectors as 
well. Colombia decreed the nationalization of banks on December 12
th, 1975 (Diario Oficial, No. 
34477, p.121). This policy showed that Latin America was particularly suspicious of foreign capital 
that flowed into the commanding heights of the economies such as oil exploration, which raised 
domestic disquiets in the country (Ocampo 1996, 256).  
 
Four years after, the country barely resembled a South American version of Japan; inflation 
permanently  increased  trade  protection  for  the  main  industries  slightly  lessened,  manufactured 
exports diminished and tended to decline, capital investment was paralyzed, public transferences to 
the private sector enlarged and direct tax revenues shrunk. In the air, there was a bitter taste of what 
was  known  as  neoliberal  policies.    The  next  government  would  go  back  protectionist  and 
expansionary policies.  
 
What were the causes of such a reversal? Why was the economy not able to take a step 
toward higher economic growth? Different accounts of this failed reform episode have highlighted 
some of the causes. These causes can be grouped in three categories: exogenous shocks, reform 
implementation, and interest groups
20. In the first category two international shocks are considered: 
the 1974 oil pr ice shock and the 1976 coffee boom. The oil shock imposed harsh economic 
conditions just when the government was engaging in tight fiscal and monetary policy. This fact 
made it much more difficult to undertake the stabilization plan. In contrast, the 1976  coffee boom 
brought extra trade income, bringing incentives to relax macroeconomic policies. The second 
category includes factors such as the scope, order, and timing to carry out specific policies (tax 
reform and trade liberalization). Along these lines,  the reforms could be deemed half -hearted, 
clumsily  carried  out  and  naively  formulated.  Also,  the  institutional  structure  of  economic 
policymaking appeared as an obstacle for consistent and sustained implementation.  Finally, the 
third category refers to the response and interaction of interest groups in the light of these reforms. 
In this case, potential losers were strong enough to counteract harmful measures whereas the 
g o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   a c t i o n s   f a i l e d   t o   o f f s e t   t h e   a d v a n c e   o f   p r i v a t e   i n t e r e s t s .    
   
As was explained, economic reforms change the economic and political equilibrium. They seek to 
alter several elements and critical junctures of the institutional matrix at once, or at least, in a short 
period of time. This is an ambitious process of intended social change whose effects must be seen as 
t h e   r e s u l t   o f   m u l t i p l e   c a u s e s .   H a v i n g   s a i d   t h a t ,   t h i s   p a p e r ‟ s   o b j e c t i v e   c l e a r l y   a r i s e s ;   i t   i s   t o   p r o v i d e   a  
systematic view of these main causes in one picture. The analytical device is a simplified game 
theory model grounded in historical evidence, which establishes a point of reference to discriminate 




                                                 
20  These following authors refer to either the 1974-78 period or aspects of the reforms. Cabrera (1980), 
Morawetz (1981), Urrutia (1983), Bejarano (1984; 1985a), Kalmanovitz (1984 1
st Ed.), Martinez (1986), 
Ocampo (1987a 1
st Ed.) Pécaut (1987), Bulmer-Thomas (1994), Clavijo (1992), Garcia and Jayasuriya (1997), 
Garay(1998),  Misas (1980, 1999), Edwards (2001).   
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The players  
   
They are three players (n=3): the Government (G) and two economic sectors, Coffee (Cs) and 
Industry (Is). The selection of these sectors as players needs some consideration. To consider a 
sector as one entity is a simplification since internal disagreements may prevent one from seeing a 
group of producers as a homogeneous entity. In fact, the heterogeneity involved by agents who have 
as much interest in industry as in agriculture could weaken the idea that these two sectors are truly 
independent  entities.  However,  the  existence  of  distinct  associations  representing  each  s e c t o r ‟ s  
claims indicates that by 1970 they had specific, visible and differentiable interests. As usual, a 
parsimonious analysis comes at the expense of excluding other potential players as the working 
class,  the  commerce  or  financial  sector.  However,  this  simplified  setup  still  captures  the  key 
dynamic.  
 
k S  denotes the set of strategies of player k, where    Is Cs G k , ,  . Government has two pure 
strategies: to commit to full reforms (F) or to commit to half reforms (H). These strategies reflect 
t h e   g o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   c o m p r o m i s e .   C o f f e e   a n d   I n d u s t r y   h a v e   t w o   p u r e   s t r a t e g i e s   a s   w e l l :   t o   c o m m i t   t o  
the reforms proposed by Government, which means to cooperate (C), or to reject them, which 
means to defect (D).  The game is simultaneous and there is symmetric information for common 
k n o w l e d g e   a n d   o b s e r v a t i o n   o f   o t h e r s ‟   i n t e r e s t s   .   C o n s e q u e n t l y ,   t h e   u n c e r t a i n t y   c o m e s   f r o m   e a c h  
p l a y e r ‟ s   i g n o r a n c e   o n   o t h e r   p l a y e r s ‟   d e g r e e   o f   c o m m i t m e n t   t o   t h e   r e f o r m s .    
 
When Government chooses full reforms but both sectors defect, Government is forced to follow 
half reforms, whereas when Government chooses half reforms and both sectors defect, it is forced to 
not to undertake reforms at all. Thus, the consequences of mutual defection change according to the 
reform version. Mutual defection of a full reform signifies that Government, Industry and Coffee 
e n d   u p   s u p p o r t i n g   t h e   h a l f   v e r s i o n   w h i l e   a   h a l f   v e r s i o n ‟ s   d e f e c t i o n   i n d i c a t e s   t h a t   p l a y e r s   c h o o s e   t h e  
status quo.  The game can be visualized either in the upper or lower side of the tree in Figure 1. 
Once a player takes into account the actions of the other players, one out of eight possible strategies 
may be chosen. The strategies for every player are given by the set  k S . Each strategy indicates the 
combination of strategies chosen by G, Cs and Is respectively.  The letters F and H will differentiate 
G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   p u r e   s t r a t e g i e s .   F o r   i n s t a n c e ,   t h e   s t r a t e g y   F C C   d e n o t e s   t h a t   G   c o m m i t   t o   f u l l   r e f o r m s  
and  Cs  and  Is  choose  to  uphold  their  commitment.  The  set  k S for  player  k  is, 
  HDD HDC HCD HCC FDD FDC FCD FCC Sk , , , , , , ,   
 
These eight strategies are identified by their enumeration from one to eight in the order above listed. 
The associated function of payoffs for  k S  is  
 
8 1,...., i i k K K U     i = 1 , … , 8  
 
The upper subscript points the strategy so that 
1
i K i n d i c a t e s   p l a y e r ‟ s   p a y o f f   f r o m   s t r a t e g y   1   w i t h  
rank i. The rank refers to the order that a player assigns to each strategy, one being the highest, or 
the most desirable, and eight the lowest. The payoff function is specified in a ranking that must 
r e f l e c t   h o w   t h e   p l a y e r   e v a l u a t e s   e a c h   s t r a t e g y ‟ s   n e t   b e n e f i t s .   I t   i s   c l e a r   t h a t   f o r   s u c h   a n   e v a l u a t i o n   a  
p l a y e r   k e e p s   i n   m i n d   t h e   e f f e c t s   o f   o t h e r   p l a y e r s ‟   c h o i c e s   o n   its own payoffs. Therefore, to establish 
t h e s e   r a n k s ,   i t   i s   n e c e s s a r y   t o   i d e n t i f y   e v e r y   p l a y e r ‟ s   b a l a n c e   o f   g a i n s   a n d   l o s s e s   a s s o c i a t e d   w i t h  
each strategy.  Since the impact of the strategies differs across players, the relationship with the 
reforms is spec i f i c   t o   t h e   p l a y e r .   E a c h   p l a y e r ‟ s   c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s   a r e   a n a l y z e d   f o r   d e p i c t i n g   h i s   o v e r a l l  






T h e   b a s i c   p r e f e r e n c e   o f   a n y   g o v e r n m e n t   i s   t o   s t a y   i n   o f f i c e   a n d   i n c r e a s e   i t s   p a r t y ‟ s   p o l i t i c a l  
capital. Since politicians seek reelection in a basic democratic setting, they have to please their 
electorate throughout institutions mainly structured by the constitution and the political dynamics. 
Also, politicians are self-interested and may advance their personal interests whenever there is room 
f o r   i t .   A   g e n e r a l   e x p e c t e d   g a i n s   f u n c t i o n   l i k e   t h e   f o l l o w i n g   c a p t u r e s   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   m o t i v a t i o n s :    
 
] ), ( ), ( ), ( [ ) ( 3 2 1     W I Cs
G V E V E V E f V E  ,    1 1   a n d   β ≥ 0 .     (1) 
 
) ( Cs V E and  ) ( I V E r e p r e s e n t   t h e   e x p e c t e d   v a l u e   o f   C o f f e e ‟ s   a n d   I n d u s t r y ‟ s   p r o f i t s ,   r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  
r e f l e c t i n g   t h a t   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   p o l i t i c a l   c a p i t a l   h i n g e s   o n   t h e   e c o n o m i c   p e r f o r m a n c e   o f   t h e s e   s e c t o r s .  
) ( W V E s t a n d s   f o r   t h e   e x p e c t e d   w o r k e r s ‟   i n c o m e   s i g n a l i n g   t h i s   g r o u p   a s   a n   e l e c t o r a l   f o r c e   f o r   t h e  
r u l i n g   p o l i t i c a l   p a r t y .   S e c t o r s ‟   e x p e c t e d   v a l u e s   w i l l   b e   d e f i n e d   l a t e r ,   u n l i k e   w o r k e r s ,   w h o   d o   n o t  
appear  as  a  player  in  the  game
21.   T h e   c o n s t a n t   δ   r e p r e s ents  the  weight  each  sector  has  in 
G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   i n t e r e s t s .   H e r e ,   3 2 1      , meaning that Coffee brings higher political support 
( n o t   v o t e s )   f o r   t h e   r u l i n g   p a r t y   t h a n   i n d u s t r y   o r   w o r k e r s .     T h e   p a r a m e t e r   β   c a p t u r e s   p o t e n t i a l  
opportunistic  gains  from  the  reforms  because  of  agency  problems  such  as  corruption  or 
informational asymmetries
22. The preferences are outlined by the following decision rule, which 
i n d i c a t e   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   a c t i o n s .    
 
Decision Rule for G: It prefers those strategies in which Cs cooperates over those when Cs 
defects. If Cs chooses C, it would rather commit to full (F) rather than to half reforms (H) and it 
prefers that both sectors cooperate instead of only one. If Cs defects, it chooses H over F but it 
prefers that industry cooperates rather than defects.   
 
The  rule  points  out  that  Government  prefers  full  to  half  reforms  reflecting  its  ideological 
a l i g n m e n t   i n   e c o n o m i c   p o l i c y .   B u t   t h i s   p l a y e r   m u s t   b e   r e s p o n s i v e   t o   s e c t o r s ‟   s u p p o r t .   C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  
it gets a higher payoff for undertaking full reforms when Coffee cooperates. The appeal of full over 
half  reform  comes  from  two  sources.  First,  Government  obtains  a  stronger  political  position 
domestically  if  the  main  economic  sector  follows  its  policies.  Second,  it  increases  its  political 
capital abroad if it is in harmony with the international consensus on economic policy. However, 
the loss of domestic support leads Government to prefer half reforms because international approval 
is not as critical as internal approval.  For the decision rule to be appropriate, it is assumed that 
G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   c o m m i t m e n t   t o   f u l l   r e f o r m   i s   s i n c e r e .   A l s o ,   i t   i s   s u p p o s e d   t h a t   G o v e r n m e n t   w e i g h s  
domestic political support higher than international support and that that support mainly comes 
from Coffee.  As a result, if Coffee defects, G prefers the half version of the reforms, although in 
that case, it also prefers at least to have the support of industry than not to have any support. The 
most undesirable payoff is obtained when G chooses a full reform and none of the sectors cooperate 
because mutual sector defection would severely undermine its capital value.  
 
                                                 
21 The question about the specific form of the expected value functions (concave, convex or linear), and hence 
t h e   p l a y e r ‟ s   a t t i t u d e   t o w a r d   r i s k ,   is not addressed here since general forms are used. 
22 H o w e v e r ,   t h e   o p p o r t u n i s t i c   g a i n s   a r e   t e m p o r a l   a n d   c o u l d   i n c r e a s e   r u l i n g   p o l i t i c i a n s ‟   w e a l t h   b u t   s e r i o u s l y  
harm their political capital in the long-run. Assessing the importance of this variable requires a more detailed 
analysis of the context.  
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This picture is grounded in the historical characterist i c s   o f   L o p e z   M i c h e l s e n ‟ s   g o v e r n m e n t   a n d  
the Colombian state. The link between private and public interest was particularly tight with the 
coffee sector. Between 1910 and 1960 the country became the second largest world producer of 
coffee. By 1950, 78% of t h e   c o u n t r y ‟ s   t o t a l   e x p o r t s   w e r e   c o f f e e ,   c o n s o l i d a t i n g   t h e   l i n k   b e t w e e n   t h e  
national  economy  and  the  international  market.  After  the  Great  Depression,  coffee  producers 
became a powerful group that dominated the macroeconomic policy and coo-legislated its own 
regulation policies (Palacios 1983, 504). Indeed this sector structured the Colombian state through 
its affective collective action (Mares 1993). The National Federation of Coffee Producers (FNC), a 
sui  generis  institution  of  mixed  character  between  an  interest  group  and  a  decentralized  state 
agency, set the channel for this high leverage. Many managers of the FNC served as Ministry of 
Finance, revealing this figure as an intermediate between this interest group and the state (Palacios 
1983, 522). Furthermore, with the National Coffee Fund, established in 1940 to manage public 
revenues from special coffee taxes, the FNC acquired significant financial power. The Fund had as 
a main objective the regulation of the coffee supply through crop purchases and price regulation. 
Also, it was intended to support the short-term financial needs of coffee exporters and facilitate 
commercialization. In terms of institutional structure, the FNC was a semi-state organism with 
autonomy and therefore isolated from the political class and the parliament (Ocampo 1987, 288). 
 
   N o t   o n l y   w a s   t h e   i n s t i t u t i o n a l   s t a t e   s t r u c t u r e   p r o n e   t o   p r i o r i t i z e   t h e   c o f f e e   s e c t o r ‟ s   n e e d s ,  
b u t   a l s o   A l f o n s o   L o p e z   M   f o u n d   h i m s e l f   b o u n d e d   t o   t h e   s e c t o r ‟ s   i n t e r e s t s .   H e   c a m e   f r o m   o n e   o f   t h e  
e l i t e ‟ s   p r o m inent families, whose fortune rested on coffee business and whose importance in the 
Colombian  political life  had  been long-established. Alfonso  Lopez  Pumajero, his father,  was a 
l i b e r a l   l e a d e r   i n   t h e   1 9 4 0 ‟ s   r e c o g n i z e d   b y   h i s   a c h i e v e m e n t s   i n   l a n d   r e f o r m   a n d  labor-favorable 
l e g i s l a t i o n .   L o p e z   M i c h e l s e n   o p e n l y   a c k n o w l e d g e d   h i s   “ d o l p h i n ”   c h a r a c t e r ,   s i n c e   h e   w a s   i n   h i s  
f a t h e r ‟ s   f o o t s t e p s   a d d r e s s i n g   t h e   w o r k i n g   c l a s s   d e m a n d s   a n d   p r o m o t i n g   p r o s p e r i t y   ( G o m e z   1 9 7 8 ,  
61). A growing mass of urban workers, absorbed more dynamically by industry than by agriculture, 
w o u l d   f i n d   L o p e z ‟ s   p r o p o s a l s   a t t r a c t i v e   ( s e e   G r a p h s   3   a n d   4   i n   a p p e n d i x   1 ) .      
 
  Along with labor-favorable legislation, Lopez claimed for an industrial adjustment under 
the light of the comparative advantage and   e f f i c i e n c y   p r i n c i p l e s .   L o p e z ‟ s   d i s c o u r s e   a l s o   u n d e r l i n e d  
t h e   u r g e n c y   f o r   i n c r e a s i n g   t h e   a g r i c u l t u r e ‟ s   p r o d u c t i v i t y ,   b u t   b y   m e a n s   o f   m o r e   d e v e l o p m e n t a l  
credits that would capitalize farms at a larger scale (Pecáut 1988, 249). In his view, the agricultural 
sector  was  considered  as  the  key  engine  because  the  country  was  mainly  agrarian.  Thus,  he 
advocated the promotion of agriculture and the purging of industry at a time when Industry and 
agriculture equally contributed to the GDP. While agriculture went from contributing over 27% of 
t h e   G D P   i n   t h e   1 9 6 0 ‟ s   t o   2 3 %   i n   t h e   1 9 7 0 ‟ s ,   I n d u s t r y   i n c r e a s e d   i t s   a g g r e g a t e   v a l u e   f r o m   2 1 %   t o  
23% in the same decade. (See Graph 2 in appendix 1). 
 
      Coffee  
 
This  sector  aims  to  obtain  higher  profits,  which  depend  on  the  real  value  of 
domestic  ) / ( P P Q c c  and international sales  ) / (
* * P EP Q c c  and real input costs (r,w). The 
profits are altered by net subsidies to final prices ) ( c  , taxes ) ( c  and transferences  ) ( c   
                                                 
23 T h e   r a n k i n g   o f   G ‟ s   s t r a t e g i e s   c a n   b e   e x p r e s s e d   a s   F C C > F C D > H C C > H C D > H D C > H D D > F D C > F D D .   
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from  Government.  The  following  general  function indicates the main arguments  of the 
expected profits.   
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c c c c




P Q c c c c
* *
       (2) 
 
The first four arguments are positively related to profits. P represents the general level of prices 
and e stands for the nominal exchange rate. The last three arguments in the function are inversely 
related to profits. Because of the close relationship between the National Coffee Fund and the 
government and the monetary authorities, the general level of prices, and by this way the real 
exchange rate, was substantially influenced by the international coffee prices. This fact is captured 
by the following function, where the expected inflation depends on the growth of money and the 
gap between the current and the average international coffee prices
24. 
 
)] ( , [ ) (
* *
c c P P M f E      ,    0< <1          (3) 
 
The parameter  refers to the degree whereby the fluctuations of the international 
prices are transmitted to the domestic economy. Then,   points the monetization due to the 
coffee price cycles.  
 
By  the  beginning  of  1970  the  coffee sector  showed  signs of  weakness.  Coffee  exports 
reduced its participation in the total exports to 50% reflecting changes in the coffee world market as 
well as in the domestic structure of production. Other domestic sectors questioned the power of the 
FNC  in  relation  to  the  state  in  the  light  of  conflicts  around  devaluation,  inflation  and  income 
redistribution goals through fiscal policies (Palacios 1983, 523; Pécaut 1987, 270). At the core of 
the debate was the high correlation between exchange rate management and the international coffee 
prices  for  when  the  coffee  price  was  high  (or  low)  the  real  exchange  rate  appreciated  (or 
devaluated)
25. Coffee cycles did not contributed to the development of non -coffee sectors despite 
the stabilization effect on the exchange rate provided by the crawling peg system. 
 
It is reasonable to contend that the sector perceived  L o p e z ‟ s   r e f o r m   a g e n d a   a s   a   w a y   t o  
address all these criticisms. Coffee would benefit from lower fiscal deficits, financial openness, and 
trade liberalization because the pressures on higher taxation and the capital costs would diminish. 
Coffee  was  not  as  sensitive  to  the  trade  reform  as  Industry  because  it  did  not  have  external 
competitors in the domestic market and its exports hinged on a bargained share of the international 
market.  Furthermore,  the  relative  strength  of  the  National  Coffee  Fund  eased  the  financial 
constraints the sector may have experienced. Real devaluations were not crucial to maintain its 
internal competitiveness, which rested on a high productivity relative to other domestic sectors 
(Ocampo 1996, 288). An additional appeal of the reforms stemmed from the fact that the reforms 
did not question price controls, subsidies or tax exceptions enjoyed by Coffee.   
 
                                                 
24 The macroeconomic effect of the coffee boom took place through domestic coffee price increases. Over 
two thirds of the internati o n a l   p r i c e   f l u c t u a t i o n s   w e r e   t r a n s m i t t e d   t o   t h e   d o m e s t i c   p r i c e s   d u r i n g   t h e   1 9 7 0 ‟ s .  
Ocampo (1987, 310). 
25 Gomez Buendia and Leibovich,(1987). Echavarria (1999) observes that when the coffee sector did not go 
well, the rest of the economy did go well.   
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However, Coffee was particularly sensitive to the tax reform. Historically, the sector had 
fiercely opposed discriminatory taxes on its exports for it claimed fiscal neutrality among sectors. 
Between 1963 and 1974 the fiscal revenue from coffee exports declined from 78% to 36.2%, a 
result of its intense lobbying and the unclear methodology of adjusting taxation according to the 
external cycles (Pécaut 1987, 260-2; Ocampo 1987, 275-94). The criticisms pointed out the extra 
income the sector perceived because of the real devaluation introduced by the crawling peg system. 
According to the criticizers, there must be resource transfers from Coffee to other undeveloped 
sectors by means of higher taxes. The sector argued that when a boom occurred, the subsequent real 
appreciation equated to a tax on coffee exports. Later on, Coffee would allege that the boost in the 
domestic demand would allocate much better the resources all over the domestic sectors than any 





Like Coffee, Industry seeks higher profits. The following general function fairly captures its 
main incentives where the symbols stan d   f o r   t h e   s a m e   v a r i a b l e s   l i k e   i n   t h e   C o f f e e ‟ s   f u n c t i o n :  
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The Great Depression was the opportunity for the expansion of industry and acceleration of 
economic growth. From this period on, a dynamic group of entrepreneurs would emerge. They 
invested  in  industry  but  also  were  linked  to  agro-exporters  involved  in  coffee  production  and 
commercialization. These new industrial agents led the industrial and coffee sector. They had close 
objectives in which, though there might have transitory disagreements, there was no deep political 
and economic antagonisms (Palacios 1988, 506). This commonality of interests began to vanish in 
t h e   1 9 6 0 ‟ s .   I n d u s t r y   a d v a n c e d   t o w a r d   t h e   p r o d u c t i o n   o f   c o m p l e x   g o o d s ,   l e a d i n g   p r o c e s s e s   o f  
vertical and horizontal integration. In particular, horizontal integration drove it to incorporate and 
establish financial institutions that facilitated the transformation of old family firms into limited 
liability companies. The concentration of the ownership along with new conglomerates redefined 
n e w   i n d u s t r i a l   i n t e r e s t s   b y   t h e   1 9 6 0 ‟ s ,   p l a c i n g   t h e s e   i n t e r e s t s   c l o s e r   t o   t h e   f i n a n c i a l   s e c t o r   t h a n  
coffee producers. Nonetheless, Industry was far from having the same cohesion and strength as 
Coffee as to openly confront Coffe e ‟ s   i n t e r e s t s   w h e n e v e r   t h e y   w o u l d   h a v e   s e e n   a s   h a r m f u l .   I n d e e d ,  
the support granted by governments under the ISI prevented the sector from structuring an effective 
collective action (Mares 1993). 
 
Industry concentrated on the production of foods, beverage and textiles. Its production was 
mainly intended to domestic markets and was more capital than labor intensive. In the period 1950 
to 1970, Industry advanced from the production of nondurable goods (foods, beverages, clothes) to 
the production of intermediate goods (textiles, paper, chemicals, minerals, basic metals), and at 
lesser extent, toward capital goods production. By 1974, 37% of the industrial aggregate value was 
concentrated on nondurable goods, 49% on intermediate goods and 14% on capital goods (Ocampo 
1996, 274).   
 
At this point, Industry found it convenient to relax trade controls for it had imported 67% of 
t h e   t o t a l   i m p o r t s   d u r i n g   t h e   1 9 6 0 ‟ s .   T w o   t h i r d s   o f   t h e s e   i m p o r t s   w e r e   r a w   m a t e r i a l s   w h i l e   t h e   r e s t  
was capital goods.  The reduction in non-trade and trade barriers began in 1970, targeting raw  
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materials and capital goods. However, in 1974 sectors such as beverages, textiles, clothes, woods, 
shoes, and plastics had still nominal trade tariffs higher than 60%, whereas sectors like food, paper 
and chemicals had tariffs around 25% on average. Taking into account non-trade tariff restrictions 
such  as  previous  import  licenses,  quantitative  restrictions  and  money  deposits,  the  effective 
protection for food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, clothes, furniture, and plastics was beyond 100%.  
Among the capital goods, transportation equipment had an effective protection around 80% (Garay 
1998, 320).  All these were industries in which national firms cornered domestic markets.  
 
Trade reform seemed to be a double-edge sword; on one hand, they would mean lower 
costs of imported raw materials and capital goods and, by these means, eventually higher exports. 
On  the  other  hand,  they  would  low  domestic  sales  and  threaten  domestic  firms  if  their 
competitiveness happen to be poor in comparison to foreign firms. This trade-off was portrayed by 
t h e   s t r u g g l e s   t h a t   L o p e z ‟ s   g o v e r n m e n t   w o u l d   h a v e   t o   f i g h t   o v e r c o m e   s o   a s   t o   e l i m i n a t e   t r a d e  
restrictions (Martinez, 1986).  
 
Ultimately, the viability of trade reform hinged on the value of industrial exports, which 
were  determined,  in  the  short-run,  by  expectations  of  expanded  markets  brought  by  trade 
agreements,  stability  of  the  real  exchange  rate  and  export  subsidies.  On  trade  agreements,  the 
Andean Pact promised new opportunities and meant a crucial incentive to trade liberalization. It is 
worth noticing that, despite the economic nationalism, textiles, one of the main domestic industrial 
sub-sector, considered trade agreements with the U.S
26.  As for the real exchange rate, Industry was 
aware  of  Coffee dominance  and contended  that position.  Regarding  subsidies,  Industry  was 
especially  sensitive  to  reductions  in  the  export  subsidy  called  CAT  (Certificado  de  Ahorro 
Tributario). On September 1974, Government reduced this subsidy from 15% to 5% arguing that it 
increased the budget deficit. However, as long as the industrial exports were encouraged by 
alternative policies this sector was willing to negotiate
27.   I n d u s t r y ‟ s   e x p e c t a t i o n s   o f   l o w e r   c a p i t a l  
costs and higher investment inflows by means of financial liberalization had the potential to initially 
offset the risks entailed by a higher exposition to international markets.  
 
A s   t o   f i s c a l   a n d   t r a d e   r e f o r m s ,   I n d u s t r y   w a s   o p e n   t o   c o n s i d e r   c r u c i a l   i s s u e s   w h i l e   L o p e z ‟ s  
first-year. This sector took an active role in criticizing the measures and pointing out its advantages 
a n d   d i s a d v a n t a g e s .   T h e   i n d u s t r i a l   a s s o c i a t i o n s ,   a l o n g   w i t h   o t h e r   p r o d u c e r s ‟   o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  
constantly underscored the need of defining more aggressive strategies to overcome the financial 
tightness and stimulate trade
28.  In doing so, Industry managed to reach some beneficial agreements 
with Government like lower capital taxes to limited liability companies
29. Ultimately, the economic 
reforms meant policies that addressed  I n d u s t r y ‟ s   c l a i m s ,   w h i c h   h a d   b e e n   o v e r l o o k e d   b y   p a s t  
governments. The developmental strategies of preceding governments focused on agriculture and 
                                                 
26 The   o f f i c i a l   a d h e r e n c e   t o   t h e   “ I n t e r n a t i o n a l   t r a d e   A g r e e m e n t   o f   T e x t i l e s ” ,   e s t a b l i s h e d   o n   D e c e m b e r   2 0
th , 
1973, took place on January 1977. See Diario Oficial #34714, pages 178-181. Nevertheless, the industrial 
association, ANDI, pointed out that the agreement must be reconsidered because it was not favorable to 
national producers. See El Tiempo, August 12
th , 1975, page 8A. 
27 Industry´s reaction against this measure can be seen at El Tiempo, September 22
nd , 1974, page 11A. See 
also El Tiempo, September 29
th , 1974, page 13A and November 1
st , 1974, page 1. ANDI, the industrial 
a s s o c i a t i o n ,   p o i n t e d   o u t   t h a t   C A T ‟ s   r e d u c t i o n s   d i s c o u r a g e d   e x p o r t s   a n d   e m p h a s i z e d   t h a t   s u c h   r e d u c t i o n s   h a d  
to come along more flexible capital market. Afterward, ANDI and other associations proposed an export plan 
where other incentives substitute the CAT, El Tiempo, December 6
th , 1974, page 1.  
28 See El Tiempo, Marzo 10, 1975, page 6A. 
29 This turned out one of the amendments to the fiscal reforms enacted at the beginning of the Economic 
Emergency. El Tiempo, October 13, 1974, page 1. Subsequently, at the end of 1974, important industrial 
bus i n e s s m e n   f r o m   A n t i o q u i a   e x p r e s s e d   t h e i r   s u p p o r t   t o   L o p e z ‟ s   g o v e r n m e n t ;   s e e   El Tiempo, December 19
th, 
1974, page 9A.   
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urban building development – e . g .   C u r r i e ‟ s   P l a n .   T h i s   f e d   I n d u s t r y ‟ s   s e n t i m e n t   o f   b e i n g   n e g l e c t e d  
and reinforce d   i t s   p e r c e p t i o n   o f   i n c o m p l e t e   i n d u s t r i a l   p o l i c i e s .   I n   I n d u s t r y ‟ s   e y e s ,   t h e   p r o m o t i o n   o f  
industrial exports, implemented since the mid-1 9 6 0 ‟ s ,   w a s   a   b r o a d   p o l i c y   t h a t   s t i l l   d e m a n d e d   a c t u a l  
support and complementary policies (Pecaut 1988, 201). 
 
Interactions between Coffee and Industry  
   
The possibility of a coffee boom introduces uncertainty to the game. The game starts with a 
move of Nature (N), which decides on a random event outside the control of players such as the 
level of coffee price. Coffee price could take two levels: it could be either average or high; hence 
Nature is the player that decides whether or not the economy is going to experience a coffee boom. 
The game is represented in the Figure 1 below. The vectors at every terminal node correspond to 
e a c h   p l a y e r ‟ s   p a y o f f s .   N a t u r e ‟ s   m o v e   b r i n g s   t w o   p o s s i b l e   s u b -games:  one  when  the  prices  are 
average and the other when they are high.  Because the players do not have perfect information, 
they need to estimate probabilities of the occurrence of these  sub-games.  The information set 
available before the game starts indicates to all players that the economy was exposed to export 
cycles  due  to  fluctuations  of  international  coffee  prices.  This  was  a  main  characteristic  of  the 
Colombian  economy  determining  its  macroeconomic  setting.  Policymakers  and  coffee  growers 
were aware of the main role of coffee as a commodity which is subject to trade fluctuations. In 
response, they  designed  tools  aimed  at  regulating  the  domestic  coffee  market  and  engaging  in 
international agreements to control the world supply and prices. Thereby, the probability that coffee 
prices  were  over  the  historical  average  was  positive,  though  some  policy  tools  decreased  this 
p r o b a b i l i t y   i n   t h e   s e n s e   t h a t   t h e y   c u s h i o n e d   o s c i l l a t i o n s ‟   e f f e c t s   a nd kept prices away from high or 
low extremes.  
 
However, the Coffee prices skyrocketed in 1976 bringing about an unexpected situation. 
First, the international agreement between major producers and the U.S., the main consumer, had 
not established market shares since 1972, something that was redefined only until 1980. Second, 
Brazil, the biggest producer, underwent severe frosts at the end of 1975, dramatically decreasing the 
world supply (Ocampo 1996, 316). As a result, the national supply of coffee, unconstrained by the 
international  market,  could  expand  and  capture  a  great  deal  of  the  extraordinary  increase  in 
international prices (see Graph 10 and 12 in appendix 1).   
 
These  events  evidenced  the  difficulties  players  faced  in  drawing  correct  and  precise 
inferences about the level of coffee prices. Under such circumstances, players are not able to form 
Bayesian probabilities because something completely unforeseen took place. In terms of the game, 
it means that they do not have mixed strategies to protect th e m s e l v e s   f r o m   N a t u r e ‟ s   m o v e ,   s o   t h e y  
must play at either decision node (high or average) once Nature chooses and they are able to update 






                                                 
30 As the subjective probabilities players draw do not coincide with the objective probability nature plays 
w i t h ,   t h e   n o t i o n   o f   B a y e s i a n   p r o b a b i l i t i e s   l a c k s   o f   p o w e r   i n   g u i d i n g   p l a y e r ‟ s   m a x i m i z a t i o n   u n d e r   u n c e r t a i n t y .  








This  update  occurs  differently  in  Government  and  sectors.    Figure  one  indicates  this 
characteristic of the game in which the uncertainty is represented by joining the decision nodes of 
G.  Like  sectors,  Government  could  not  foresee  changes  in  coffee  prices,  but  unlike  them, 
Government did not update its payoffs and ranked them differently once the new scenario emerged. 
T h i s   r e f l e c t s   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   c o m p r o m i s e   w i t h   t h e   r e f o r m s ;   n o   m a t t e r   w h a t   s p e c i a l   s i t u a t i o n   c o u l d   
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have happened, Lopez M. was engaged in keeping down the inflation, fiscal deficit and trade tariffs. 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,   i t   m a y   b e   i n t e r p r e t e d   l i k e   G ‟ s   i n a b i l i t y   t o   r e s p o n d   t o   a   s h o c k .   T h u s ,   G ‟ s   p a y o f f  
ranking is formed as if this shock were an irrelevant factor; consequently the rank is the same under 
average and high p r i c e s .   T h i s   f e a t u r e   i s   g r o u n d e d   o n   t h e   q u a l i t a t i v e   a n a l y s i s   o f   L o p e z ‟ s   g o v e r n m e n t  
orientation where it was never considered, neither ex-ante nor ex-post,  the incompatibility between 
full reforms and a coffee boom, as well as potential conflicts arising from their coexistence. Excess 




Coffee and Industry, in contrast to G, did react in the light of the boom and adjust their 
payoffs. Hence, their decision rules must be changed in view of coffee prices substantially higher. 
Analyzing these adjustments underscores some basic facts. To begin with, the interaction between 
Coffee and Industry has some commonality; that is, both wish the benefits from sta bilization and 
structural adjustment and share some common interests, though they have also some opposing 
goals. These mixed interests might lead them to several types of strategic interactions; in this 
exercise two of these types, an  assurance game and a p r i s o n e r ’ s   d i l e m m a   g a m e ,   are chosen. The 
typology of payoffs for a simultaneous two-player game is now introduced by following Tsebelis 
(1990). In a simultaneous two-person game there are four possible outcomes: reward (R) for mutual 
cooperation,  penalty  (P)  for  mutual  defection,  temptation  (T)  when  the  player  defects  and  the 
opponent cooperates, and sucker (S) when the player cooperates and the opponent defects.  
 
The reward payoff occurs when both sectors support the reforms whether the full or half 
version,  and  the  penalty  payoff  is  obtained  when  both  sectors  defect.  Thus,  the  sectors  find 
cooperation desirable and profitable, although the strategic interaction could prevent them from 
doing this. Here the reward (or penalty) payoff might be either higher or lower under the full than 
under the half version of the reforms. That a sector finds a full reform more profitable (or harmful) 
than  a  half  reform  mainly  depends  on  its  own  evaluation  of  costs/  benefits.  In  a  dynamic 
perspective, every sector has to weigh net benefits against long-term net benefits as well as find out 
how  much  uncertainty  it  will  face  in  regard  to  those  net  benefits  for  they  are  contingent. 
D e t e r m i n i n g   n u m e r i c a l l y   t h e s e   v a l u e s   a n d   o t h e r   v a r i a b l e s   t h a t   c o u l d   a f f e c t   p l a y e r s ‟   p a y o f f s   i s  
beyond the scope of this exercise. Instead, overall preference rankings are established through the 
typology of the assurance and p r i s o n e r ‟ s   d i l e m m a  game, which as will be argued best fit the main 
historical facts. The next section illustrates how these games capture strategic interactions between 
Coffee and Industry and reflect basic features of their own rating system




                                                 
31 Once the Coffee boom is well recognized, Lop e z ‟ s   g o v e r n m e n t   d e c l a r e d   t h a t   t h e   b o o m   w a s   t o t a l l y   a s   m u c h  
unexpected as the way in which it messed up the economic policymaking. El Tiempo, July 21
st, 1977, page.6.  
32 The continued real revaluation of the exchange rate revealed Government´s attachment to the crawling peg 
system. See Garcia and Jayasuriya (1997). Indeed, few plans for promoting non-traditional exports would 
raise positive expectations under real revaluation.  
33 Payoffs must capture everything the player cares about in the outcomes of the game, and in order to do so, 
he calculates the consequences of his choices by using his own value system (Dixit and Skeath 2004, 30). 
Whether a player considers full reforms better than half reforms depends on his perception of the current 
economic performance and his evaluation of alternatives regimes. This perception can differ between sectors 
and it might also depart from the prescriptions of the extant economic policy. Hence, the payoff rating system 
of a player hinges on his understanding of the economy, which in turn depends on the information available, 
his sector or class interests, ideology and beliefs about future.   
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Average Coffee prices: an Assurance Game 
 
So far, it was stated that both sectors find the reforms desirable under average coffee prices. 
The assurance game captures an interaction where mutual cooperation is the preferred outcome and 
t h e r e   i s   n o   e x p l o i t a t i o n   o f   t h e   o p p o n e n t ;   r a t h e r ,   b o t h   p l a y e r s   p r e f e r   t o   f o l l o w   t h e   o t h e r ‟ s   s t r a t e g y .  
For example, if Coffee defects full reforms, then it do e s   n o t   b e n e f i t   f r o m   I n d u s t r y ‟ s   c o m m i t m e n t   t o  
full reforms insofar as Coffee understands that its commitment is also necessary for the reform to be 
profitable in its interest.  Industry judges the situation in regard to Coffee in the same way. Thereby, 
one p l a y e r ‟ s   d e f e c t i o n   a n d   t h e   o t h e r   p l a y e r ‟ s   c o o p e r a t i o n   d o   n o t   l e a d   t o   a p p e a l i n g   p a y o f f s .   I n   a n  
a s s u r a n c e   g a m e ,   t h e   o r d e r   o f   t h e   s t r a t e g i e s ‟   p a y o f f s   f o r   b o t h   p l a y e r s   i s   g i v e n   b y   R > T > P > S .   U n d e r  
a v e r a g e   c o f f e e   p r i c e s ,   t h e   o t h e r   s e c t o r ‟ s   e x p l o i t a t i o n   i s   p r e v e n ted by the jointly movement of the 
expected  real  value  of  production  and  price  inputs  in  the  expected  value  functions.  Since  the 
reforms would bring down inflation and input costs, and stimulate productivity, the payoffs for both 
sectors would evolve in the same direction.  
 
The sectors find the full version of the reforms more profitable in this sub-game under 
average coffee prices. This preference order is based on the declarations of Coffee and Industry in 
which  both  made  public  their  willingness  for  full  stabilization,  regarded  complete  financial 
deregulation as favorable, were willing to negotiate a tax reform and agreed in reducing the state 
size. Although other aspects, such as eliminating some price controls and reducing all trade tariffs 
remained controversial, it is reasonable to interpret that the support was for full reforms. Clearly, 
potential disagreements, likely in a basic democracy, cannot be translated as radical opposition. 
Instead, what must be highlighted are prospects of progressive negotiations
34.  
 
The decision rules for Cs and Is are specified once the interaction with G is taken into account:  
 
Decision Rule for Cs and Is (Average coffee price): Including a superscript in the payoffs, 
with f indicating the payoff under full reforms and h under half reforms, the payoff order for 








f . A sector chooses the reward (R) or the 
temptation (T) payoff when G chooses F over the R or T payoffs when G chooses H.  However, 
it prefers the penalty (P) or the sucker (S) payoff when G chooses H rather than the P or S 
payoffs when G prefers F.  
 
The  game  establishes  that  a  player  prefers  cooperation  to  defection  when  the  other  sector 
cooperates, choosing R, and prefers defection to cooperation when it defects, choosing T. The 
reward and the temptation payoffs are higher under full reforms than under half reforms because of 
s e c t o r s ‟   p e r c e p t i o n s .   I n   t h e   s a m e   w a y ,   t h e   p e n a l t y   a n d   t h e   s u c k e r   p a y o f f   a r e   l o w e r   u n d e r   f u l l  
reforms than under half reforms reflecting that when only one sector engages with full reforms, it 
has to endure alone the whole tax burden and the lower level of subsidies.  Thus, each player 
r e c o g n i z e s   t h e   f u l l   r e f o r m ‟ s   b e n e f i t s   b u t   i s   n o t   w i l l i n g   t o   u n d e r g o   t h e   e n t i r e   c o s t   o n   i t s   o w n ,   w h i c h  
is heavier under the full than under the half version of the reforms.  
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34 Naturally, one must have reserves about the veracity of those declarations and at what extent they were 
“ c h e a p   t a l k ” .   H o w e v e r ,   i t   i s  assumed that players are sincere to proceed with the analysis at first instance. 
T h i s   m e a n s   t h a t   t h e r e   i s   n o   i n c e n t i v e   t o   h i d e   o n e ‟ s   t r u e   i n t e r e s t s   i n   o r d e r   t o   e l i c i t   a   r e s p o n s e   f r o m   t h e   o t h e r  
player that would bring additional benefits. Here, it underlies the assumption of perfect information in the 
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H i g h   C o f f e e   p r i c e s :   a   P r i s o n e r ’ s   D i l e m m a   G a m e  
 
Under  high  coffee  prices,  the  set  of  strategies,  denoted  by k S ,  has  the  same  eight 
possibilities for each player, although the payoff functions are different. The interaction between 
players changes because some of the variables in the expected value functions have opposite effects 
in Coffee and Industry. Overall, the bone of contention would be inflation, mainly driven by coffee 
prices as was explained, and whose management would reduce the expected real value of industrial 
output  while  it  would  increase  the  expected  value  of  coffee  production  under  the  boom.  Both 
sectors,  aware  of  their  relative  strength  and  the  institutional  framework,  could  recognize  that 
G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   r e s p o n s e   t o   t h e   c o f f e e   b o o m   w o u l d   l e a d   t h e   e c o n o m y   t o   e x p e r i e n c e   a   D u t c h   d i s e a s e . 
It could occur because Coffee would bring inflationary pressures. The disease would stimulate the 
nominal  demand  for  non-tradable  production  and  discourage  the  supply  of  non-coffee  tradable 
sectors in the short-run. Even though neither Coffee nor Industry could foresee a coffee boom, they 
could certainly identify the consequences when a boom takes place.   
 
High prices led Coffee to regard the half version of the reforms more advantageous than the 
full version, whereas industry still preferred the full version. This is because full stabilization would 
bring about higher costs for Coffee, stemming from a one-digit inflation target and fiscal deficit; 
under tight monetary policy, much of the extraordinary profits from exports could not get into the 
economy and coffee businessmen would have to wait to realize their profits in domestic currency. 
M o r e o v e r ,   d i s c i p l i n i n g   f i s c a l   p o l i c i e s   w o u l d   p u t   m o r e   p r e s s u r e s   o n   C o f f e e ‟ s   i n c o m e   w h e r e b y   i t s  
short-run profits would diminish.  To Industry, full reforms are appealing because the control of 
inflation  would  guarantee  a  stable  real  exchange  rate  while  the  financial  liberalization  would 
provide the capital that Industry had longed for. Yet, this positive stance critically depended on 
broader opportunities in the internati o n a l   m a r k e t .   I n d u s t r y ‟ s   s t r a t e g i e s   w o u l d   n a t u r a l l y   h i n g e   o n  
Coffee choices, which Industry knows would be adjusted in the light of the boom.   
 
A   p r i s o n e r ‟ s   d i l e m m a   g a m e   f a i r l y   c a p t u r e s   t h i s   i n t e r a c t i o n   b e c a u s e   i n   t h i s   g a m e   t h e  
opposition  of  interests  lead s   t o   t h e   o p p o n e n t ‟ s   e x p l o i t a t i o n .   T a k i n g   i n t o   a c c o u n t   t h e   r e f o r m  
components, defection for Coffee signifies it does not commit to full but to half stabilization; in 
addition, its defection closes the possibility of attaining full structural adjustment. However, Coffee 
m i g h t   b e n e f i t   f r o m   I n d u s t r y ‟ s   c o m m i t m e n t   t o   f u l l   s t r u c t u r a l   a d j u s t m e n t ,   e s p e c i a l l y   i n   t h e   v i e w   o f   i t s  
a t t a c h m e n t   t o   p r o t e c t i o n .   I n d u s t r y ‟ s   a c c e p t a n c e   o f   f u l l   r e f o r m s   w o u l d   b r e a k   d o w n   p r a c t i c e s   t h a t  
burdened the fiscal budget and lessened market competition. In the same way, to Industry, defection 
means to commit not to full but to half structural adjustment. In this case, Industry evidently avoids 
t h e   a c c o m p l i s h m e n t   o f   f u l l   s t a b i l i z a t i o n ,   b u t   i t   i s   a w a r e   o f   p o t e n t i a l   b e n e f i t s   f r o m   C o f f e e ‟ s  
comm i t m e n t   t o   f u l l   s t a b i l i z a t i o n .   C l e a r l y ,   g i v e n   C o f f e e ‟ s   m a i n   r o l e   i n   d r i v i n g   m a c r o e c o n o m i c  
variables,  low  inflation  and  fiscal  discipline  would  bring  stability  that  in  turn  would  stimulate 
economic  growth.  In  consequence,  each  sector  prefers to  defect  in order to protect itself from 
exploitation, no matter what the other does.  
 
The decision rule for Coffee is stated as, 
 









f. Then, Cs prefers the temptation (T) payoff regardless of whether G chooses F or 
H, although it prefers the payoff obtained under H. In the same way, after T, it prefers R whether  
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G chooses F or H, although it prefers that obtained under H. After R, it prefers P regardless of 
whether G chooses F or H, though it prefers that obtained under H. After P, it prefers the payoff 
it gets under H. 
 
Coffee has a strong incentive to defect and has a preference for the strategies where government 
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The decision rule for Is corresponds to, 
 









f. Is prefers the temptation (T) and the reward (R) payoff when G chooses F rather 
than the T and R payoffs obtained when G chooses H. However, it prefers the penalty (P) payoff 
if G chooses either H or F rather than the sucker (S) payoff. In addition Is prefers the P and the S 
payoff under H rather than under F.    
 
T h i s   r u l e   i s   n o t   a s   s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d   a s   C o f f e e ‟ s   d u e   t o   i n d u s t r y ‟ s   w e a k e r   s t a n c e   b e f o r e  
Government and Coffee. The rule indicates that Industry prefers full to half reforms but it would 
choose  to  defect  over  to  cooperate.  Industry  is  better  off  whenever  Coffee  cooperates  and 
Government undertakes full reform. However, when Coffee defects Industry finds half reform more 
advantageous since the payoffs are lower when full reform is supported by only one sector; Industry 
understands that full reform would turn out much more costly of carrying out by itself
35.  
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 The higher payoff for every player corresponds to mutual cooperation as typically occurs in a 
p r i s o n e r ‟ s   d i l e m m a .   C o f fee and Industry acknowledge the superiority of the cooperative solution 
over mutual defection. However, the situation each one considers the best does not coincide; Coffee 
judges the best situation like the one of half reform whereas Industry finds the best circumstance as 
t h a t   u n d e r   f u l l   r e f o r m .   T h e   i n t e r a c t i o n   b e t w e e n   s e c t o r s   i s   s t i l l   a   p r i s o n e r ‟ s   d i l e m m a   i n   w h i c h   t h e  
d i s p a r i t y   o f   f o c a l   p o i n t s   t a k e s   p l a c e   d u e   t o   a   t h i r d   p l a y e r ‟ s   p r e s e n c e ;   t h a t   i s   G o v e r n m e n t .   A s   w a s  
e x p l a i n e d ,   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   r a n k i n g   d o e s   n o t change with the coffee price because it fails to recognize 
the incompatibility between the coffee boom and the reforms. By doing this, Government does not 
alter its policies keeping the same order of strategies, although its payoffs indirectly change because 
o f   t h e   v a r i a t i o n s   i n   s e c t o r s ‟   p a y o f f s .    
 
At this point, the main elements of the game represented in Figure one has been introduced. 
The initial  scenario  for  the  reforms  was  one  of  average  coffee  prices,  represented  by  the  first 
subgame at the upper side of the diagram. The players began to play an assurance game, where the 
uncertainty came from the simultaneity of actions. In Figure one, the ovals binding the decision 
nodes of Coffee and Industry indicate that none of the players know in advance which sector would 
                                                 
35 F o r   I n d u s t r y ‟ s   p r e f e r e n c e   f o r   f u l l   r e f o r m   t o   b e   v a l i d ,   t h e   “ p r o g r e s s i v e ”   f a c t i o n   o f   t h i s   s e c t o r   h a s   t o   b e   t a k e n  
as representative. Evidently, there were some producers whose antipathy to the reforms was deep, particularly 
about trade issues.  However, these adverse sentiments were manageable and could have diminished if the 
trade agreements would have opened sound expectations of wider commercial possibilities.    
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cooperate and what type of reforms Government would commit to. This game was played once 
Coffee and Industry recognized the high coffee prices; the players placed themselves in the lower 
d e c i s i o n   n o d e   a f t e r   n a t u r e ‟ s   m o v e ,   t u r n i n g   t h e   g a m e   i n t o   a   p r i s o n e r ‟ s   d i l e m m a   b e t w e e n   s e c t o r s .   T h e  
s e c o n d   s u b g a m e   a t   t h e   b o t t o m   s i d e   o f   t h e   d i a g r a m   c o n v e y s   t h i s   s i t u a t i o n .   T h e s e   s u b g a m e ‟ s   p a y o f f s  
h a v e   a n   u p p e r   b a r   t h a t   d i f f e r e n t i a t e s   t h e m   f r o m   t h e   a s s u r a n c e   g a m e ‟ s   p a y o f f s .   G o v e r n m e n t  
perceived the change in sec t o r s ‟   s t r a t e g i c   i n t e r a c t i o n   a n d   m u s t   a l s o   p l a c e   i t s e l f   a t   t h e   l o w e r   n o d e .  
But Government did not change its payoff rankings whereas Coffee and Industry did it. In this 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,   G o v e r n m e n t   i s   a   p a s s i v e   s p e c t a t o r   o f   s e c t o r s ‟   r e a c t i o n s ,   b e c a u s e   i t   d i d  not update its 
preferences  in  order  to  prevent  the  most  suboptimal  outcomes.  The  next  section  analyses  the 
p o s s i b l e   r e s u l t s   f r o m   t h e s e   g a m e s .   I t   w i l l   i l l u s t r a t e   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   r o l e   i n   d r i v i n g   t h e   s t r a t e g i c  
interaction between sectors.   
 
Theoretical Outcomes  
 
In both sub-games, when all players cooperate, that is the strategy FCC is played, then full 
reforms are attained, and when all players defect, strategy HDD, the status quo is chosen.  The 
structure of the subgame captures several paths for achieving half reforms since the strategies where 
at least one player commits either to full or half reform will bring about a change in the status quo; 
in this sense, a half-hearted reform will take place. The extent in which these half reforms divert 
from the status   q u o   d e p e n d s   o n   t h e   c o o p e r a t i v e   p l a y e r ‟ s   p o w e r   a n d   i n f l u e n c e ,   b a s i c a l l y   b e c a u s e   o f  
a s y m m e t r i e s   b e t w e e n   p l a y e r s .     F o r   e x a m p l e ,   s e c t o r s ‟   m u t u a l   d e f e c t i o n   w h e n   G o v e r n m e n t   p r o p o s e s  
full reforms, FDD, turns out more costly for everybody because it involves struggles among players 
u n d e r m i n i n g   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   p o l i t i c a l   c a p i t a l   a n d   d e m a n d i n g   l o b b y   f r o m   s e c t o r s .   I n   o p p o s i t i o n ,  
s e c t o r s ‟   m u t u a l   c o o p e r a t i o n   w h e n   G o v e r n m e n t   u n d e r t a k e s   h a l f   r e f o r m s ,   H C C ,   m a y   r e s u l t  
economically and politically more convenient for all players. By considering these paths, possible 
results from economic reforms are portrayed more realistically.   
 
T h e   s i m p l e s t   n o t i o n   o f   s o l u t i o n ,   t h e   N a s h ‟ s   e q u i l i b r i u m ,   i s   a p p l i e d   i n   o r d e r   t o   f i g u r e   o u t  
tentative results. Here players are rational, self-interested and uncooperative. Hence, there are two 
a n d   o n e   p o s s i b l e   N a s h ‟ s   e q u i l i b r i a   u n d e r   a v e r a g e   a n d   h i g h   c o f f e e   p r i c e s   r e s p e c t i v e l y .   I n   t h e   f i r s t  
scenario, they correspond to the strategies when all players cooperate (FCC or full reform) and all 
players defect (HDD or status quo) while in the second scenario all players defect (HDD or status 
q u o ) .   T h e   s t r u c t u r e   o f   t h e   a s s u r a n c e   g a m e   a n d   t h e   p r i s o n e r ‟ s   d i l e m m a   e v i d e n t l y   d e t e r m i n e d   t h e s e  
points. While in the assurance game only one of the equilibria is an optimu m ,   F C C ,   i n   t h e   p r i s o n e r ‟ s  
dilemma the equilibrium is suboptimal since the players could be better off if they choose any 
s t r a t e g y   g i v i n g   h i g h e r   p a y o f f s   f o r   a l l   t h e   p l a y e r s .   T h e   N a s h ‟ s   e q u i l i b r i u m   s e t s   a r e
36:  
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6 I C G NEHigh   
 
Under  average  coffee  prices,  the  strategic  interaction  leads  to  a  coordination  problem 
between sectors, where the attainment of the optimal equilibrium depends on the ability to set a 
focal point such that all players choose to cooperate rather than to defect. Government could play a 
critical role in solving the coordination problem by building up its credibility on its commitment 
and  by  establishing  mechanisms  to  facilitate  the  bargaining  between  sectors  entailed  by  full 
reforms. Conversely, if Government has no credibility or if it is not able to provide means to elicit 
mutual cooperation, the outcome will be mutual defection and thus half reform. Corruption and low 
governability could incline the balance toward this result. The suboptimal equilibrium under high 
                                                 
36 See Appendix 2 the matrixes of the game and their equilibrium points.   
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coffee  prices  suggests  that  more  governmental  action  is  required  – beyond  either  to  build  its 
credibility or to facilitate collective negotiation, so as to lead the game toward a better outcome.  
 
These theoretical insights show the outcomes of two possible scenarios. History tells us that 
n a t u r e ‟ s   m o v e   w a s   h i g h   c o f f e e   p r i c e s .   T h a t   m e a n s   t h e   a s s u r a n c e   g a m e   w a s   t r u n c a t e d   b e c a u s e   t h e  
p l a y e r s   a b a n d o n e d   i t   t o   p l a y   a   p r i s o n e r ‟ s   d i l e m m a   o n c e   t h e   c o f f e e   b o o m   a p p e a r e d .   T h e   r e s u l t s   f r o m  
the  economic  reform  which  began  in  1974  Colombia  in  absence  of  high  coffee  prices  are  not 
e m p i r i c a l l y   o b s e r v a b l e .     H o w e v e r ,   p r o v i d e d   t h a t   t h e   r e a d i n g   o f   p l a y e r s ‟   p r e f e r e n c e s   a n d   c h o i c e s   a r e  
enough  accurate,  the  theoretical  results  abovementioned  could  be  seen  as  the  basis  for  a 
counterfactual analysis where the coffee boom effect is isolated. Thus, in absence of high coffee 
p r i c e s ,   f u l l   e c o n o m i c   r e f o r m s   w o u l d   h a v e   h i n g e d   o n   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   l e a d e r s h i p   a n d   t o o l s   f o r   e l i c i t i n g  
cooperation.  Because  of  the  state  corruption,  among  other  institutional  obstacles,  and  the  low 
expectations  on  the  Andean  Pact, this  optimal  equilibrium,  that is full  reforms  through  mutual 
c o o p e r a t i o n ,   w a s   h i g h l y   u n l i k e l y .   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   f a i l u r e s –  in terms of credibility, reliability and 
accountability, would have carried most of the responsibility for failed reforms
37.   
 
T h e   p r i s o n e r ‟ s   d i l e m m a   e q u i l i b r i u m   i n d i c a t e s   t o t a l   r e j e c t i o n   o f   h a l f   r e f o r m s   a n d   t h e   r e t u r n  
to the status quo under high coffee prices. The prediction is evidently inaccurate because the factual 
outcome is better addressed like a scenario of half reforms; here certain policies of the reform 
agenda were embraced and sustained such as the fiscal deficit reduction, trade barriers decrease in 
and relaxation of capital market regulation. Nonetheless, the specific conditions of the historical 
result  are  still  undetermined  because  half  reforms  could  have  been  attained  through  several 
strategies:  mutual  cooperation  of  half  reform,  mutual  defection  of  full  reforms,  or  unilateral 
cooperation or defection of either reform. Therefore, an alternative notion of solution is needed so 
a s   t o   i d e n t i f y   t h e   g a m e ‟ s   o u t c o m e .   T h e   n e x t   s e c t i o n   w i l l   e x p l o r e   t h e   h y p o t h e s i s   t h a t   h a l f   r e f o r m s  
were reached through a coalition between players whose effect was to place the economy in a less 






6 I C G . Here, basic notions of coalitions from game 
theory will provide a guide to identify the plausible solutions.   
  
 
Coalitions: Theory and History 
 
A  coalition  may  arise  when  subsets  of  players  have  the  possibility  of  cooperating  and 
choosing joint strategies in order to share higher payoffs that non-cooperative strategies would not 
bring. A coalition entails pre-play negotiation between players as well as binding agreements to 
enforce the joint strategy.  Here, the expected values are transferable so as players can make side-
payments  whereby  they  induce  cooperation.  A  coalition  is  defined  by  the  set  of  players  that 
conforms it and its characteristic function, which indicates the minimum payoff the coalition can 
guarantee independently of what the players not in the coalition choose. This payoff is the value, 
                                                 
37 Though it might be argued that the coffee boom stimulated corruption, several authors found that from the 
beginning, and before the coffee boom, corruption scandals surrounded the government. Ardila (1978), and 
Pécaut (1988, 293-296). Not only was the ethic of the presidential family doubtful but also the ethic of the 
political  houses,  the  traditional  parties  and  the  entire  political  system.  Hartlyn  (1993)  interprets  this 
characteristic as the legacy of the National Front, which often concentrated too much on struggles on the 
allocation of state bureaucracy. For example, the instability of the presidential staff was shown off by the high 
turnover  of  ministers,  thirty  three  ministers  during  four  years,  which  is  an  exclusive  r e c o r d   o f   L o p e z ‟ s  
government. Posada, Ignacio (1989).   
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worth or power of a coalition and it is at the same time the security level of the coalition
38. Why and 
what coalitions could emerge from a game constitutes basic questions. Once these existential issues 
are defined, questions on communication, enforceability and distribution of the gains are central for 
d e t e r m i n i n g   c o a l i t i o n s ‟   f e a s i b i l i t y   a n d   s t a b i l i t y ,   a n d   g a m e ‟ s   s o l u t i o n .    
 
Consid e r   t h e   p r i s o n e r ‟ s   d i l e m m a   a n d   t h e   a s s u r a n c e   g a m e .   B o t h   s u b -games are essential 
because players gain more by colluding than by acting individually. In each game, there are seven 
possible coalitions (2
3-1=7). Three are the one-element coalitions whose value corresponds to the 
individual safety level. Other three are the bilateral combinations, and finally there is the grand 
coalition including all players. Because the analysis rests upon ordinal rakings some criteria are 
needed to make sense of this informati o n .   F i r s t ,   t h e   g r a n d   c o a l i t i o n ‟ s   v a l u e   i s   d e f i n e d   h e r e   l i k e   t h e  
payoff  associated  with  the  pure  strategy  that  brings  the  highest  payoff  to  every  player  in  the 
c o a l i t i o n .   T h e   G r a n d   c o a l i t i o n ‟   p a y o f f   c a n n o t   b e   d e t e r m i n e d   i n   t h e   p r i s o n e r ‟ s   d i l e m m a ,   w h e r e a s   i n 
the assurance game it is the cooperative solution FCC.  The value of the two-element coalitions can 
be  approached  by  eliminating  dominated  strategies.  A  dominant  strategy  is  characterized  by 
u n a n i m i t y   r u l e   i n   w h i c h   a l l   i n d i v i d u a l   p a y o f f s ‟   s u b -indices  must  be  lower  than  those  of  the 
dominated strategy. This means that all players assign a higher rank to the dominant in comparison 
t o   t h e   d o m i n a t e d   s t r a t e g y .   A   c o a l i t i o n ‟ s   v a l u e   i s   u n d e f i n e d   i f   i t   i s   n o t   p o s s i b l e   t o   e l i m i n a t e   a t   l e a s t  
two dominated strategies. These cases remain undetermined because three out of four strategies –
excepting the safety level, must be mixed; it means that the coalition would randomize its dominant 
s t r a t e g i e s .   E v i d e n t l y ,   w i t h o u t   g r e a t e r   s p e c i f i c a t i o n   o f   p l a y e r ‟ s   p a y o f f s ,   c o n j e c t u r e s about such a 
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38 “ T h e   c o a l i t i o n a l   f o r m   o f   a n   n -p e r s o n   g a m e   i s   g i v e n   b y   t h e   p a i r   ( N , v ) ,   w h e r e   N = { 1 , 2 , … , n }   i s   t h e   s e t   o f  
players and v is a real-valued function, called the characteristic function of the game, defined on the set, 2
N, of 
all coalitions (subsets of N), and satisfying  
(i)  v(Ø)=0, and  
(ii)  (superadditivity)   I f   S   a n d   T   a r e   d i s j o i n t   c o a l i t i o n s   ( S ∩ T =   Ø ) ,   t h e n   v ( S ) + v ( T ) ≤ ( S T).  
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The value, v(S), is analogue of the safety level” .  ) ( ,..., 1 n i x x u is the payoff function to Player 1, given the 




Table three contains the identifiable strategies each coalition could rationally play. When 
only one strategy emerges as the only rational one, then the coalition value is defined by this pure 
strategy. The information this table renders requires two assumptions for providing useful insights. 
The first assumption, a theoretical one, sustains that the identifiable strategies are substantially more 
likely than the non-identifiable, basically because players can perceive them more straightforwardly 
than the others. The second assumption, an empirical one, asserts that these identifiable strategies 
can be ranked by using historical characteristics of the strategic scenario.  
 
A consideration of such statements is needed. The first assumption is saying that in the 
p r i s o n e r ‟ s   d i l e m m a   t h e   g r a n d   c o a l i t i o n   a n d   t h e   c o a l i t i o n   b e t w e e n   t h e   o p p o s i n g   p l a y e r s   a r e   l o w  
likely. The opposite result arises for the assurance game, where the grand coalition is defined and 
feasible, and the two sectors are more likely to   c o o p e r a t e .   E v i d e n t l y ,   i n   a   p r i s o n e r ‟ s   d i l e m m a   t h e  
sectors  may  cooperate, however  in relation  to  the  other  available strategies,  this choice is  less 
probable. Also, the grand coalition may not take place in the assurance game, as well as the sectors 
may not choose the optimal focal point. But, the presence of recognizable common interests makes 
players aware of the advantages of cooperation.  The second assumption is habilitating historical 
knowledge as a tool to discriminate the set of theoretical results and hence rule out possibilities. 
Neither the set of identifiable strategies nor a set of historical facts could determine by itself the 
game result. Both have to be combined.  
 
   Theoretically, the assurance game would favor a coalition in which the optimal strategy is 
p l a y e d   e i t h e r   b y   t h e   g r a n d   c o a l i t i o n   o r   b y   t h e   s e c t o r s ‟   c o a l i t i o n .   H i s t o r i c a l l y ,   t h e   g r a n d   c o a l i t i o n   w a s  
l e s s   l i k e l y   t h a n   t h e   s e c t o r ‟ s   c o a l i t i o n   b e c a u s e   o f   t h e   l i m i t e d   l e g i t i m a c y   o f   G o v e r n m e n t .   T h e  
coalition between sectors may have taken place as long as the macroeconomic variables would have 
remained stable. However, the coalition Cs-Is proposes a scenario of institutional change led by 
constituents instead of rulers, which is a situation not seen before, at least in the modern history of 
the country. Here, only after both sectors alignments, would have played the official ruler – that is 
Government, a role in coordinating economic agents toward a new set of rules. This coalitional by-
product of the assurance game may have come about for players to undertake the path of full 
reforms. The probabilities remain unknown though.  
 
  In  the  actual  situation,  with  the  coffee  boom,  two  coalitions  are  likely;  Government-
Industry  or  Government-Coffee.  The  former  was  much  less  feasible  than  the  latter  given  the 
s t r u c t u r e   o f   t h e   C o l o m b i a n   e c o n o m y   a n d   e a c h   s e c t o r ‟ s   r e l a t i o n s h i p   w i t h   p o w e r .   S i n c e   C o f f e e   h a s   a n  
intimate institutional link with Government and its policymaking, the coalition G-Cs has stronger 
hypothetical and historical bases. There are two possible strategies, FC and HC, this coalition could 
choose. It is no possible to single out which one would bring higher payoffs based only on the 
preference ranking. This indeterminacy reflects the fact that Government had been gaining certain 
degree of auto n o m y   i n   r e g a r d   t o   p r i v a t e   i n t e r e s t s .   F u l l   r e f o r m   a n d   C o f f e e ‟ s   c o o p e r a t i o n   w o u l d   b e  
m o r e   a t t r a c t i v e   t h a n   h a l f   r e f o r m   a n d   C o f f e e ‟ s   c o o p e r a t i o n   i n   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   e y e s .   T h e n ,   a s   l o n g   a s  
Government establishes proper side payments so as to show to Coffee that gains from full reform 









2 C C C G    ,   w h i c h   m e a n s   t h a t   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   g a i n s   f r o m   f u l l   r e f o r m s   e x c e e d  








2 C C G G      then  the  required  side 
payments from G to Cs are feasible.  
 
H o w e v e r ,   s i n c e   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   p a y o f f s   d i r e c t l y   d e p e n d   o n   C o f f e e ‟ s   e x p e c t e d   v a l u e ,   i t  
f o l l o w s   t h a t   a   l o s s   i n   C o f f e e ‟ s   p a y o f f s   w o u l d   l o w e r   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   g a i n s .   M o r e o v e r ,   t h i s   e f f e c t   i s  
underscored by t h e   r e l a t i v e   h i g h   w e i g h   G o v e r n m e n t   a t t r i b u t e s   t o   C o f f e e ‟ s   g a i n s   ( p a r a m e t e r     in  
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e q u a t i o n   o n e ) .   T h e   o n l y   w a y   t o   o f f s e t   s u c h   d e c r e a s e   i s   b y   m e a n s   o f   h i g h e r   i n d u s t r y ‟ s   e x p e c t e d  
v a l u e ,   h i g h e r     w o r k e r s ‟   e x p e c t e d   i n c o m e   o r   h i g h e r   o p p o r t u n i s t i c   g a i n s   ( p a r a m e t e r   β  in equation 
one). Only the first element will be considered since the other two are proportionally small to afford 
C o f f e e ‟ s   s i d e   p a y m e n t s .    
 
I n d u s t r y ‟ s   e x p e c t e d   v a l u e   d e p e n d s   o n   t h e   r e a l   v a l u e   o f   p r o d u c t i o n   ( s e e   e q u a t i o n   f o u r ) .   I n  
the light of lower or no s u b s i d i e s   l i k e   f u l l   r e f o r m s   e n t a i l ,   I n d u s t r y ‟ s   p a y o f f s   w o u l d   i n c r e a s e   t h r o u g h  
low input real prices so that production costs diminish. Industry also requires stable domestic prices 
and real exchange rate for stimulating exports. In addition, it would require positive prospective in 
external markets through trade agreements. 
 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,   G o v e r n m e n t   c a n n o t   i n c r e a s e   i t s   e x p e c t e d   v a l u e   t h r o u g h   a   h i g h e r   i n d u s t r y ‟ s  
e x p e c t e d   v a l u e   w i t h o u t   l o w e r i n g   C o f f e e ‟ s   e x p e c t e d   v a l u e   b y   p l a y i n g   w i t h   m o n e t a r y   v a r i a b l e s .   S u c h 
a tradeoff comes from the inflationary pressures. Because of the Dutch Disease, the Coffee boom 
raises pressures on domestic prices and revaluates the real exchange rate. If Government offsets 
these forces by keeping prices from going up, the domestic coffee price would have to be frozen, 
t h u s   r e d u c i n g   C o f f e e ‟ s   p r o f i t s   ( s e e   e q u a t i o n   t w o )
39.  The  unambiguous  alternatives  to  increase 
G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   p a y o f f s   t h r o u g h   i n d u s t r y   i s   t o   r e d u c e   i n p u t   r e a l   p r i c e s ,   w h i c h   b e n e f i t s   b o t h   s e c t o r s ,   a s  
well as expand international markets for domestic manufactures.  
 
H i s t o r i c a l l y ,   t h e   t w o   l a s t   a l t e r n a t i v e s   w e r e   n o t   f e a s i b l e   f o r   G o v e r n m e n t .   D u r i n g   t h e   1 9 7 0 ‟ s  
t h e r e   w e r e   o n g o i n g   s t r u g g l e s   a m o n g   u n i o n s ,   e m p l o y e r s ‟   r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s   a n d   t h e   g o v e r n m e n t   o n   r e a l  
wages.  Several  elements  complicated  the  bargains  like  the  industrial  productivity  slowdown, 
L o p e z ‟ s   c o m p r o m i s e   w i t h   w o r k i n g   c l a s s ,   i n c r e a s i n g   i n f l a t i o n ,   a n d   u n i o n ‟ s   r e l u c t a n c e   t o   m a k e   l a b o r  
legislation much more flexible. In consequence, no clear sign was given to entrepreneurs on this 
matter
40.  Besides,  the  bargains  on  regional  trade  agreements,  the  Andean  Pact,  lacked  true 
m e m b e r s ‟   c o m m i t m e n t ,   a n d   t h u s   c r e d i b i l i t y .   I t   r e a c h e d   s t a g n a t i o n   i n   1 9 7 6   w h e n   C h i l e   o f f i c i a l l y  
withdrew from negotiations (Garay 1998, 326).   
 
In  making  a  decision about its  capacity to  offer  side  payments to  Coffee,  Government 









7 I I vs C C   ,   i n   t h e   p r e s e n c e   o f   t o u g h   c o n s t r a i n t s .   C o f f e e ‟ s   l o s s e s   m u s t   h a v e   s e e m e d  
higher than I n d u s t r y ‟ s   g a i n s   f r o m   f u l l   r e f o r m s   g i v e n   t h e s e   p o o r   p e r s p e c t i v e s .   I n d e e d ,   n o t   o n l y   h a l f  
reforms  turn  out  economically  realistic  but  also  politically  feasible  because  of  the  institutional 
mechanisms  that  Coffee  had  to  protect  its  interests.  These  historical  facts  indicate  that  in  this 
p r i s o n e r ‟ s   d i l e m m a   g a m e   p l a y e d   i n   t h e   1 9 7 0 ‟ s   C o l o m b i a n   e c o n o m y ,   t h e   s o l u t i o n   m u s t   h a v e   b e e n  
the strategy HCD, played by a coalition between Government and Coffee against Industry.   
                                                 
39 That equates to assign a lower value to the pa r a m e t e r   λ   i n   t h e   i n f l a t i o n   e q u a t i o n .  
40 Kalmanovitz (1997, 491-501). The controversy about the minimum wage in 1976 showed the degree of 
uncertainty around labor costs. See El Tiempo, August 3
rd , 1976, page 6A. In this year, there was also an 
unsuccessful attempt to modernize the labor Code and reduce labor costs. See El Tiempo, August 5
th , 1976, 
p a g e   1 5 A .   H o w e v e r ,   a t   t h e   o u t s e t ,   G o v e r n m e n t   h a d   e s t a b l i s h e d   p o l i c i e s   f a v o r i n g   u n i o n ‟ s   a c t i v i t y .   A l s o ,   i t  
enacted mandatory inflationary adjustment in wages, right to indefinite strike and wage payments during 
strike. Likewise, the application of interest rate on firing payments was approved. This may be interpreted like 
attempts to keep hold of those constituents encouraged by the promises of social justice and higher standard 
of livings. Industry alleged that these measures increased its costs, and hindered investment and productivity 
growth. See graphs 5 and 6 in appendix 1 and El Tiempo, December 7
th, 1974, page 4.  After a general strike 
i n   1 9 7 7 ,   L o p e z ‟ s   g o v e r nment conceded 27.5% increase in the real minimum wage. On the labor reform and 
the relationship between unions and associations see Ocampo (1996, 318-332).  
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Coherently,  the  facts  fit  this  interpretation  of  the  episode.  First,  the  evidence  on  the 





T h e   f o r m a t i o n   o f   t h e   c o a l i t i o n   c o u l d   b e   t r a c k e d   b y   o b s e r v i n g   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   e c o n o m i c  
legislation. Since August 1974 and most of 1975, the legislative activity related to the reforms was 
intense. But, once the coffee boom was well recognized at the end of 1975, the economic reforms 
seemed to be congealed. Rather, the economic legislation was going to concentrate on tightening 
money supply and regulating coffee prices, investments and terms of convertibility of Coffee assets 
throughout 1976
41.  Despite official declarations of holding back the extraordinary inflow of foreign 
money, the domestic cof f e e   p r i c e   a n d   m o n e y   s u p p l y   g r e w   a t   t h e   i n t e r n a t i o n a l   c o f f e e   p r i c e ‟ s   p a c e  
(see Graphs 9 to 12 in appendix 1).  
 
The  coalition  was  openly  acknowledged  by  the  change  of  the  Minister  of  Finance  on 
D e c e m b e r   1 9 7 6   w h e n   L o p e z ‟ s   g o v e r n m e n t   w e n t   f r o m   h a v i n g   a   t e c h n ocratic minister, withdrew 
from the industrial association, to having a minister with a traditional political career derived from 
the coffee association
42.  While Government and Coffee were evidently aligned, Industry must 
endure a new policymaking.  
 
The coalition was individually and collectively rational as the previous section showed. Its 
e n f o r c e a b i l i t y   w a s   s u p p o r t e d   t h r o u g h   l e g a l   a g r e e m e n t s   i n   w h i c h   G o v e r n m e n t   f a v o r e d   C o f f e e ‟ s  
i n t e r e s t s   a n d   v i c e   v e r s a .   T h u s ,   L o p e z   a n n o u n c e d   “ t h e   b o n a n z a   i s   f o r   t h e   C o f f e e   g r o w e r s ” ,   s i g n a l i n g  
that  there  would  not  be  higher  taxes  or  other  redistributive  measures  on  extraordinary  profits. 
According to Pécaut, the state only perceived 11% of the bonanza profits at the same time that the 
sector managed to reduce its tax burden during 1977-1978 (Pécaut 1988, 260-4). In return, Coffee 
would share its export income with Government throughout the National Coffee Fund, FNC. This 
fund  would  serve  as  collateral  for  issuing  public  debt  as  well  as  would  invest  money  in 
developmental  assets  – Pagares  semestrales  de  emergencia  Economica,  Bonos  de  desarrollo 
economico, Bonos cafeteros 1975 among others, aimed at promoting other sectors
43.   
 
Meanwhile, hostile relationships, motivated by financial repression and trade openness, 
would  grow  bet ween  Industry  and  Government.  In  response,  the  Coalition  established 
compensatory payments; Government allocated resources toward industrial firms throughout loans 
p a r t l y   f u n d e d   b y   C o f f e e ‟ s   e x t r a   p r o f i t s .   I m p o r t a n t   t e x t i l e s ‟   p r o d u c e r s   l i k e   C o l t e j e r ,   b e n e f i ted from 
t h e   F N C ‟ s   s a v i n g s   a n d   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   f i n a n c i a l   d i s p o s i t i o n s .   I n   a d d i t i o n ,   G o v e r n m e n t   e n g a g e d   i n  
                                                 
41 See appendix 4: Legislative itinerary of economic reforms and Diario Oficial 1974-1978.   
42 The first Minister, Rodrigo Botero Montoya was a well-respected industrial and economist who integrated 
t h e   t e a m   l e a d e d   b y   M i g u e l   U r r u t i a ,   t h e   d i r e c t o r   o f   N a t i o n a l   D e p a r t m e n t   o f   P l a n n i n g .   B o t e r o ‟ s   r e s i g n a t i o n   i s  
officially accepted at December 23
rd , 1976. At the same time Abdon Espinosa Valderrama was appointed in 
his place. Diario Oficial, # 34718, February 7
th, 1977, page 257. 
43 See Diario Oficial: #34566, June 7
th, 1976, page 778: #34568, June 9
th 1976, page 811;#34600, July 29
th, 
1976, page 393;#34643, September 28
th 1976, page 1082;#34720, February 9
th, 1977, page 292;#34792, May 
25
th, 1977, pages 627-628;#34843,August 10
th, 1977, page 465;#34884, October 7
th, 1977, page 66;#34931, 
December 19
th, 1977page 1082.  
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s e v e r a l   l o a n s   w i t h   t h e   B I R F   f o r   a d d r e s s i n g   I n d u s t r y ‟ s   c a p i t a l   n e e d s
44.     P r o b a b l y   t h e s e   “ r e p a r a t i o n  
p a y m e n t s ”   g a i n e d   t h e   p o l i t i c a l   s u p p o r t   o f   I n d u s t r y   j u s t  w h e n   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   l e g i t i m a c y   f e l l   a p a r t   o n  
September of 1974 with the Great National Strike
45.  
 
Half-hearted Economic Reforms  
 
G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   r e a c t i o n   t o   t h e   c o f f e e   b o o m   w a s   t o   c a r r y   o v e r   h a l f   r e f o r m s   w i t h   C o f f e e ‟ s  
s u p p o r t   a n d   I n d u s t r y ‟ s   o p p o s i t i o n .   H a l f   r eforms would promote a soft version of macroeconomic 
stabilization  and  structural  adjustment,  holding  down  inflation  and  fiscal  deficit  from  reaching 
excessive high levels, and selectively lowering trade barriers and subsidies. Fulfilling these goals 
demand e d   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   c o m p r o m i s e   w i t h   C o f f e e ‟ s   i n t e r e s t s   a n d   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   s t r u g g l e   w i t h  
Industry.  In doing so, the key tool for protecting Coffee was monetary policy, which allowed the 
transmission of high international coffee prices to domestic coffee prices. While policymakers let 
domestic  coffee  prices  rise,  they  contracted  other  sources  of  expansionary  demand  like  public 
spending,  bank  operations  and  nominal  devaluation  in  order to  bring  inflation  down  (Bejarano 
1985a, 140; Ocampo 1987, 318). This means that   t h e   p a r a m e t e r   λ   i n   e q u a t i o n   t h r e e   w a s   h i g h .   A s   a  
result, average inflation in the period 1974-76 was over 22.5%; it peaked 40% in 1977 – the year 
with the highest international prices. See graphs 9 to 10 in appendix 1. 
 
P o l i c y m a k e r s ‟   r e s p o n s e   t o   t h e   b o n a n za  can  be  analyzed  with  an  OLS  regression  for 
explaining quarterly inflation during 1968-1982. The results indicate a positive and statistically 
significant relation to international coffee prices, money supply (M2) and international reserves. 
Variables  like  fiscal  deficit  and  nominal  devaluation  are  not  statistically  significant;  among 
s i g n i f i c a n t   v a r i a b l e s ,   m o n e y   s u p p l y ‟ s   c o e f f i c i e n t   i s   m u c h   s m a l l e r   t h a n   t h o s e   o f   i n t e r n a t i o n a l   c o f f e e  
price and reserves. Hence, this result suggest that inflationary pressures came mainly from coffee 
international prices
46.     
 
Consequently, real exchange rate appreciated  – see graphs 13 ad 14 in appendix 1, while 
financial  sector  shrunk  its  activity  hurting  Industry  and  lowering  expectations  on  economic 
performance. Financial sector had warned the negative effects of tight monetary policies on the 
provision of credit and capital to firms as well as on financial intermediation (Cabrera, 1982). These 
contractive measures – e.g higher banking required reserves, were perceived as a financial counter-
reform
47. Subsequently, perceptions of high capital costs due to financial repression prevailed.  
                                                 
44 El Tiempo, August 9th, 1977, page 9A. El Tiempo, September 9th, 1977, page 15A. See also Diario Oficial: 
#34536, April 23
rd, 1976 page 233; #34613, August 17
th, 1976, page 614;#34855, October 10
th, 1977, page 
98.  
45 El Tiempo, September 13
th, 1977, page 8c. Less than one month after this historic strike, Coffee lost his 
M i n i s t r y   o f   f i n a n c e   s i g n a l i n g   a   d e c l i n e   i n   C o f f e e ‟ s   d o m i n a n c e .   A t   t h e   s a m e   t i m e ,   G o v e r n m e n t   e n a c t e d  
r e d u c t i o n s   i n   i n c o m e   a n d   c a p i t a l   t a x e s .   C l e a r l y ,   t h i s   t a x   r e f o r m   b e c a m e   a   t o o l   f o r   r e c o v e r i n g   s e c t o r s ‟   s u p p o r t .  
See appendix 4.  
46 See in appendix 3 the estimations. Previous and posterior years to the period 1974-78 were included for an 
OLS to make sense. Serial correlation between the growth of coffee prices and money supply or international 
reserves does not affect the result.  
47 El Tiempo, August 4th, 1976, Page 8A. The r e p r e s s i o n   t o   b a n k ‟ s   l o a n s   w a s   h i g h .   T h e   r a t e   o f   required 
reserves for banks was raised from 35% to 46.5% between 1974 and 1977. Moreover by 1977, this rate for 
additional deposits was 100%. Pécaut (1988, 278). In some a u t h o r s ‟   v i e w   t h e   f i n a n c i a l   l i b e r a l i z a t i o n   w o u l d  
have been sustainable if the exchange rate would have been floating instead of fixed, and imports would have 
been more responsive to the excessive accumulation of foreign reserves and lower trade tariffs. Bejarano 
( 1 9 8 5 a ,   1 4 5 ) .   I t   m a y   b e   e v i d e n t ,   t h a t   C o l o m b i a n   p o l i c y m a k e r s   i n   t h e   1 9 7 0 ‟ s   c o u l d   n o t   r e l y   o n   a   f r e e   m a r k e t   o f   
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Also,  pressures from  excessive  accumulation  of international reserves  were relieved  by 
rapidly eliminating controls and barriers in the import regime. Import liberalization was accelerated 
and applied to products that did not raise harsh political struggles, while main industrial producers 
had to lobby in order to keep their protection up. The lobby was especially intense for the textile 
industry because this sub-sector went through a harsh crisis aggravated by the emergence of Asian 
competitors (Misas, 1980). In this way, trade policy was used to control inflation rather than to 
encourage competitiveness of industrial firms (Martinez 1986, Garay 1998).   
 
L o p e z ‟ s   a c h i e v e m e n t s   a s   f o r   f i s c a l   s u r p l u s   a n d   l e s s e r   p u b l i c   s p e n d i n g   w e r e   s h o r t -lived – see 
graph 7 in appendix 1. Moreover, they were offset by substantial reductions in income taxes, which 
went from 36% of current revenues in 1974 to 28% in 1978 – see graph 8 in the same appendix. 
1977 onwards, half reforms meant concessions on direct taxation; Also public spending expanded 
through higher subsidies, developmental credit and expenditure in infrastructure. 
 
 
Further Considerations: non-modeled variables  
 
Let us consider, although briefly and outside of this framework, other aspects influencing 
the historical result and simultaneously setting out the dynamics of institutional change. Hopefully, 





Low state autonomy was characteristic of Colombian governments and Lopez was well 
aware of this. He knew the tax reform was going to be a main obstacle because sectors were highly 
reluctant to pay higher income taxes. Previous governm e n t s ‟   f a i l u r e s   i n   b a r g a i n i n g   w i t h   c a p i t a l  
owners and workers had drawn a clear picture of the pitfalls. Initially, Government declared its 
commitment to stand for national interests rather than the interest of a single class or a political 
party (Lopez Mic h e l s e n   1 9 7 4 a ) .   I t   c r e a t e d   a   c o m m i t t e e   c a l l e d     “ Comision Tripartita”   o n   S e p t e m b e r  
14th,  1974,  in  which  the  interests  of  Government,  producers  and  workers  would  be  neutrally 
represented to discuss income and price control policies (Lopez Michelsen 1974b).  However, the 
honeymoon of the concerted economy was unexpectedly diluted by the declaration of the economic 
emergency (EE), just one month after the presidential possession. The EE allowed the president to 
l e g i s l a t e   d u r i n g   f o r t y   f i v e   d a y s   w i t h o u t   C o n g r e s s ‟  ratification.  The executive used this mechanism 
arguing that the budget deficit and inflation was extremely high and required immediate actions. 
Having identified the crucial role of tax reform and failures of past experiences, Government chose 
to legislate on its own over to negotiate with the Commission
48.  
 
                                                                                                                                                     
foreign money given their pre-c r a w l i n g   p e g ‟ s   e x p e r i e n c e s .   B e s i d e s ,   t h e   e c o n o m y   w a s   b y   n o   m e a n s   a b l e   t o  
increase its demand for imports so as to offset the bonanza.  
48 A l t h o u g h   t h e   j u s t i f i c a t i o n   w a s   “ t o   i n t e n s i f y   t h e   f i g h t   a g a i n s t   i n f l a t i o n   t o   p r e s e r v e   t h e   i n c o m e   a n d w a g e s ” ,  
the legislative activity derived from the EE mainly focused on the tax reform and the administrative reform. 
The former included lesser tax cuts, increases in tariffs according to the income level as well as increases in 
land taxes, luxury items and occasional profits. The administrative reform provided wide faculties to modify 
or suppress decentralized institutions. Diario Oficial No. 34170, Legislative decree 1970, September 17th, 
1974, p.645.  The period extended from August 7
th until September 17
th, 1974. See the itinerary of the reforms 
in the appendix four.  
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At  the  outset,  the  EE  was  welcomed  by  the  sectors  as  part  of  the  macroeconomic 
s t a b i l i z a t i o n .   I t   w a s   s e e n   a s   a   w a y   o f   i s o l a t i n g   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   d e c i s i o n s   f r o m   b a r g a i n i n g   o n   p r i c e s  
a n d   w a g e s   w i t h   f i r m s ‟   owners  and  workers
  49.  However,  once  the  measures  targeted  the  tax 
structure, resistance from associations came into stage. Main economic sectors such as industry, 
commerce and agriculture, rejected the measures and effectively invested resources so as to change 
t h e   e m e r g e n c y ‟ s   l e g i s l a t u r e   o n c e   t h e   s p e c i a l   p e r i o d   e n d e d
50. The next government would have to 
concede  much  more  on  tax  issues  – s e e   L a w   2 0   o f   1 9 7 9 .   C l e a r l y ,   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   s t r a t e g y   o f  
“ i s o l a t i o n ”   b a s e d   o n   t e m p o r a r y   l e g i s l a t i v e   m e c h a n i s m s   a n d   t e c h n o c r a t i c  authority  was  illusory, 
ineffective, wasted its political capital and reinforced traditional power of private agents. Moreover, 




The sustainability of the reforms  
 
T h e   o i l   s h o c k ‟ s   e f f e c t s   s h o w e d   u p   i n   t h e   m i d d l e   o f   a   t e n s e   e n v i r o n m e n t   b e t w e e n   p r i v a t e  
sectors  and  Government  because  of  the  tax  reform.  In  the  light  of  the  subsequent  recession, 
Government  abandoned its  radical  position in  regard  to taxes  (see  economic  cycle  in  graph  1, 
appendix 1). Meanwhile, private sectors were given policies and promises of relief in behalf of the 
e c o n o m i c   r e c o v e r y .   T h i s   a c t i o n   s u s t a i n e d   a s s o c i a t i o n s ‟   w i l l i n g n e s s   t o   c o o p e r a t e   w i t h   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s  
plans
51. However, the costs of  the recession and fiscal adjustment fell on the shoulders of state 
bureaucracy and workers in both formal and informal sector. Certainly, considerations to workers 
w o u l d   t a k e   p l a c e   b u t   o n l y   a t   t h e   b e g i n n i n g   o f   L o p e z ‟ s   g o v e r n m e n t ;   B y   t h e   e n d   o f   1 9 7 4 ,   t h e   t e xtile 
i n d u s t r y   a s k e d   f o r   w o r k e r s ‟   c o l l e c t i v e   v a c a t i o n s   a n d   a   s h o r t e r   w o r k i n g   d a y   b e c a u s e   o f   t h e   r e c e s s i o n .  
Some  months  later,  Government  denied  the  request
52. The Coffee boom onwards, this sort of 
measures would have been less frequent. State downsize, cuts   in public spending and wage 
a d j u s t m e n t s   l o w e r   t h a n   i n f l a t i o n   h e a t e d   s o c i a l   h o s t i l i t y   t o w a r d   L o p e z ‟ s   r e f o r m s .   O n c e   i n f l a t i o n  
w e n t   u p   b e y o n d   h i s t o r i c a l   r e c o r d s ,   a   m y r i a d   o f   c i v i l   p r o t e s t s   a n d   s t r i k e s   b u r s t   o u t .   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s  
expected value went down along wit h   w o r k e r ‟ s   e x p e c t e d   i n c o m e .   T h e   p e r i o d   1 9 7 5 -77 registered the 
highest  number  of  strikes  along  with  civil  protests  that  ended  violently.  Here,  protesters 
radicalization could not always be controlled by unions themselves
53.  
                                                 
49 Some associations and unions expressed their support to the Economic Emergency before it went on to 
modify the tax structure. El Tiempo, September 15th, 1974, page 1.  Nonetheless, claims of participation in 
the decision-making of the economic policy were made. See El tiempo, October 3rd, 1974, page 1 and 6A.  
50 (Pecáut 1988, 253). Changes in tax legislation are shown in appendix four. The 1974 tax reform is cogently 
portrayed by Urrutia (1983, 175-2 3 2 ) ,   b u t   f r o m   h i s   t e c h n o c r a t i c   p o s i t i o n   i n   L o p e z ‟ s   g o v e r n m e n t .  
Unfortunately, his efforts to demonstrate that associations had little leverage to modify the definitive tax 
reform fell down under the light of the tax structure that emerged in the 1 9 8 0 ‟ s   a s   a   r e s p o n s e   o f   t h e   c o u n t e r -
reforms of 1977 and 1979. See tax reforms evolution throughout 1974,1977, 1979 and 1983 legislation on 
Garay (1998, 298-300). 
51 The main associations of industry and commerce declared that there was a recession despite the positive 
official statistics and government‟ s   p e r c e p t i o n   o f   h i g h   e c o n o m i c   g r o w t h .   N o n e t h e l e s s ,   t h e y   a c k n o w l e d g e d   t h e  
reforms as necessary and stated their willingness to negotiate rules. El Tiempo, December 19
th, 1974, p. 9A, 
and December 20
th, 1974, p. 1. For example, because of the difficulties experienced by textile producers, 
Government offered a soft loan to four major companies in the country.  El Tiempo, August 6
th , 1975, page 2. 
Later on, Government deferred payments these companies must do. El Tiempo, July 30
th, 1976, Page 15A. 
52 El Tiempo, March 4
 th , 1975, Last page of section A. 
53 Pécaut, (1987, 301-313) see statistics about strikes in page. 307. Ocampo (1996, 327). The most memorable 
strike, in terms of its intensity, was the national civil protest in September 14
th, 1977. It occurred in the middle 
of the Coffee boom showing how sudden prosperity and social harmony clashed.    
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In contrast to the Frente Nacional,   L o p e z ‟ s   g o v e r n m e n t   r a i s e d   e x p e c t a t i o n s   o f   a   t r u e   r e t u r n  
to democracy. Political openness was stated in terms of both governmental structure and political 
participation. The wide electoral support that Lopez gained unleashed political demands he could 
not address; even more fatally, that he could not adequately channel and control. Thus, Lopez did 
not break the tradition of military repression because of a latent threat of instability entailed by 
leftish forces, ruling under a constant state of siege since 1975 for maintaining public order. Yet, the 
stage  of  siege  did  not  help  Government  reach  agreements  with  unions  and  sustain  favorable 
business environment
54. Meanwhile, tensions among the executive, traditional political class and 
military forces augmented. At the outset of 1978, Government had lost the support of workers, 
peasants, and most of economic sectors. The next government would have to bargain upon modest 
L o p e z ‟ s   a c h i e v e m e n t s   l i k e   f i s c a l   d i s c i p l i n e ,   t r a d e   l i b e r a l i z a t i o n   a n d   t a x   r e f o r m .    
 
 
The emergence of new players 
 
Corruption and atrophied democracy were obstacles for a sound government. Further, social 
injustice  feeding  growing  guerrillas,  increasing  crime  rate  – mainly  kidnapping,  rising 
unemployment,  a  justice  system  in  crisis  and  an  extensive  practice  of  smuggling  conformed  a 
situation  where  illegal  economy  thrived.  Clandestine  exports  of  coffee,  cattle,  emeralds,  and 
manufactures brought an important income to the country. Clearly, governance was limited and 
easily broken (Pécaut 1987, 313).   
 
  The appearance of drugs trafficking started with the Marihuana Bonanza and went on with 
coca production. Since 1974 cultivated areas increased, and the country specialized in refinement of 
coca  paste  coming  from  other  Andean  neighbors.  Drugs  exports  would  have  peaked  in  1977, 
introducing additional inflationary pressures. The central bank through the so-c a l l e d   “ ventanilla 
siniestra” ,   a l l o w e d   t h i s   i n f l o w   b y   c h a n g i n g   d o l l a r s   t o   p e s o s   t h r o u g h   c l a n d e s t i n e   t r a n s a c t i o n s .   T h e  
black market of dollars pushed down even more the exchange rate. To make up the inflow, official 
statistics reported a farfetched export boom of manufactures that was corrected by posterior studies 
(Morawetz 1981, 11-38; Pécaut 1987, 278; Steiner 1997, 54). 
 
How does this new player – drug   t r a f f i c k e r s ,   f i t   i n   t h i s   p i c t u r e   o f   1 9 7 0 ‟ s   C o l o m b i a ?   T h e   n e w  
player was noticed by other players, although it did not have a defined identity or direct channels to 
get into the game yet. The other players would have thought about how this presence could affect 
their payoffs as well as open new strategies. Drugs trafficking would have meant an attractive 
alternative  of  capital  investment.  Moreover,  it  could  pay  off  politicians.  However,  it  would 
complicate  so  much  a  scenario  of  extant  corruption,  violence  and  social  disorder.  These 
perspectives  must  have  decreased  expected  returns  of  operating  in  the  legal  economy.  Indeed, 
taking the path of reforming institutions so as to foster economic growth and political stability 
would have meant to politicians and economic agents to overcome serious obstacles. Visibly, the 





                                                 
54 In 1976, Lopez proposed a Constitutional Assembly initially aimed to reform local and regional 
administration and the justice system. However, Lopez sought to modify electoral rules as well. Pécaut (1987, 
2 9 0 ) .   T h e   r o l e   o f   m i l i t a r y   f o r c e s   a n d   i t s   i n t e r n a l   d i v i s i o n   i n   t h e   a d v e n t   o f   a   g e n e r a l i z e d   “ m o r a l   c r i s i s ”   i n   t h e  
Colombian society is particularly intriguing. Pécaut (1987, 299-301).  
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IV.  Conclusions 
 
The  answer  to  why  the  economic  reforms  failed  in  1974  Colombia  involved  several 
elements. The point of departure was the emergence of a favorable context toward progressive 
institutional change. 1970 onwards, the economic and political dynamic drove the leading economic 
sectors and Government to question the ISI model and redefine the rules of the game. Coffee lost 
some of its relatively dominant position and Industry experienced expansionist incentives from the 
external  and  internal  market,  whereas  Government  strengthened  its  position  by  widening  its 
electoral base and technocratic support.  This change in forces could be read it as an episode of 
e l i t e ‟ s   r u p t u r e   i n   w h i c h   t h e   s c o p e   o f   t h e   e c o n o m i c   a n d   p o l i t i c a l   r i g h t s   n e e d e d   t o   b e   e x t e n d e d .  
Therein lays the inclusion of social demands as well as the claims for the expansion of industrial 
activity.   
 
The evidence suggests that the sectors were initially willing to undertake full reforms –
above  defined,  while  Government  stated  a  strict  compromise  in  this  regard,  especially  as  for 
macroeconomic  stabilization.  Historically,  Government  had  well-built  institutional  links  with 
C o f f e e ‟ s   i n t e r e s t s   a n d   i t s   p o l i c y m a k i n g   h a d   f e w   d e g r e e s   o f   f r e e d o m ;   E c o n o m i c   p o l i c y   t o o l s   a s  
higher taxation, more flexible exchange rate management, significant trade agreements and truly 
competitive schemes for private in v e s t m e n t   w e r e   f a r   f r o m   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   s c o p e .   I n   t h i s   s e n s e ,   a s  
many  authors  have  pointed  it  out,  Government  lacked  autonomy  and  private  agents  had  well 
entrenched interests into the state machinery.  
 
The 1976 coffee boom introduced a deep confrontation between the sectors – a   p r i s o n e r ‟ s  
dilemma. They came into a strategic interaction that led them to half reforms. Here, Coffee and 
Government collude while Industry bore a great deal of the costs. In that interaction, Government 
had a rigid compromise with macroeconomic stabilization– n o   m a t t e r   t h e   c o f f e e   b o o m ,   a n d   C o f f e e ‟ s  
i n t e r e s t s   p r e v a i l e d   o v e r   I n d u s t r y ‟ s .   A   c o a l i t i o n   b e t w e e n   G o v e r n m e n t   a n d   C o f f e e   t o o k   p l a c e   f o r  
g u a r a n t y i n g   C o f f e e ‟ s   e n j o y m e n t   o f   i t s   e x t r a o r d i n a r y   p r o f i t s   a n d   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   i m p l e m e n t a t i o n   o f  
half-hearted  reforms.  Industry  must  endure  financial  repression  and  lesser  trade  protection. 
Government appears here as an inflexible agenda setter poorly endowed; Coffee as the dominant 
player whose short-run interests won through; and Industry as the weak player who openly opposed 
to policies that the G-Cs coalition set out with the coffee boom. No surprise comes by hearing that, 
i n   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   e y e s ,   t h e   c o f f e e   b o o m   w a s   t h e   m a i n   o b s t a c l e   t o   f u l l   r e f o r m s   a n d   t h a t   I n d u s t r y   w a s  
the villain who backwardly opposed to progressive economic policies. Certainly, Government failed 
t o   r e c o g n i z e   t h e   c h a n g e   i n   p l a y e r s ‟   i n t e r e s t s ,   t h e r e b y   b u r y i n g   t h e   l i t t l e   s t a t e   a u t o n o m y   p r e v i o u s l y  
gained. 
 
Once the coffee boom effect is isolated– that is by considering the assurance game, the 
economic reforms were likely to fail for Government lacked tools for negotiating with Coffee more 
consensual institutions on macroeconomic policies as well as with Industry appealing mechanisms 
for promoting competitiveness. Moreover, Government did not have accountability and endured 
limited governability so as to drive players toward positive expectations on a new economic and 
political  equilibrium.  However,  this  assessment  must  be  seen  cautiously  as  all  counterfactuals. 
Although the boom modified a n d   t a n g l e d   p l a y e r s ‟   s t r a t e g i e s ,   i t s   a b s e n c e   w o u l d   n o t   h a v e   g u a r a n t e e d  
that full reforms would have been successful.  
 
In this light, institutional change is a path built on a progression of games. That is strategic 
interactions  among  decisive  players  whose  results  or  equilibria  decide  the  next  game.  Specific 
institutions establish the initial constraints and incentives; also players face power relationships 
expressed  through  a  policy  regime.  Shocks  introduce  innovations  thus  opening  and  closing  
 
41 
alternatives   a n d   r a i s i n g   e x p e c t a t i o n s ,   w h i c h   i n   t u r n   m o d i f y   p l a y e r s ‟   i n t e r a c t i o n .   T h e   a b i l i t y   o f  
players to react and comprehend the effects from those shocks is fundamental because it updates the 
set of information and strategies all players have. As a result, coordination poses lesser problems 
and focal points arise more straightforwardly.   
 
 Economic reforms can be seen as a game where Government plays as an agenda setter who 
provides – either concedes, grants or negotiates, incentives and greatly defines specific measures on 
p o l i c y   i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .   C o n s e q u e n t l y ,   o n   t h e   a g e n d a   s e t t e r ‟ s   c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s   r e s t s   g r e a t  
responsibility for determining the direction of the institutional change mainly driven by economic 
p o l i c i e s .     I n   t h e   a n a l y z e d   c a s e ,   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   p o o r   u n d e r s tanding of and limited autonomy for 
s o l v i n g   t h e   d i l e m m a s   “ e c o n o m i c   r e f o r m s   v s .   c o f f e e   b o o m ” ,   “ N o n -c o f f e e   s e c t o r s   v s .   C o f f e e   s e c t o r ” ,  
“ S h o r t -run  vs.  Long-run  economic  growth  led  to  half  reforms.  Again,  no  surprise  comes  by 
acknowledging that one of the regre s s i v e   f a c t o r s   t o   p o s i t i v e   i n s t i t u t i o n a l   c h a n g e   i n   1 9 7 0 ‟ s   C o l o m b i a  
lays on non-neutrality of state actors. Those actors faced deep limitations so as to include and 
represent the interests of great variety of groups so that they would be truly taken into account and 
p o l i t i c a l l y   b a r g a i n e d .   I n   t h i s   r e f o r m   e p i s o d e ,   C o f f e e ‟ s   a n d   G o v e r n m e n t ‟ s   i n t e r e s t s   p r e v a i l e d   o v e r  
I n d u s t r y ‟ s   a n d   w o r k e r s ‟ .   C o n s e q u e n t l y ,   I n d u s t r y   a n d   w o r k e r s   s o u g h t   t o   p r o t e c t   t h e m s e l v e s .   T h e  
emphasis should be moved from the mechanisms that incumbent players have in order to care about 
their payoffs – l i k e   t r a d i t i o n a l l y   h a s   b e e n   p o i n t e d   o u t ,   t o   t h e   a g e n d a   s e t t e r ‟ s   a b i l i t y   t o   t a k e   a d v a n t a g e  
of changes in incentives and power relationships.    
 
The fundamental question then is how to find the path that leads societies from weak to 
strong state actors – those who act in behalf of the majority of citizens?. We know from this analysis 
that  such  an  endeavor  necessarily  involves  a  succession  of  strategic  interactions.  The  initial 
condition is generally a situation of limited access to the state and a reduced number of decisive 
players (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2005). In those games, two factors as important as the existing 
institutional structure must be included. First, it is the role of specific individ u a l s   w h o   g r a s p   g a m e ‟ s  
nature and provide meaningful leadership. Second, it is the role of shocks, which bring about new 
balances  in  power  relationships  and  economic  opportunities.  Undoubtedly,  the  best  games  are 
played  by  players  that  better  understand  their  constraints  and  possibilities,  identifying  how  to 
modify them.      
 
S o m e   c o m m e n t s   o n   t h e   h i s t o r y   o f   C o l o m b i a   f o l l o w .   1 9 7 7   w a s   t h e   w o r s t   y e a r   f o r   L o p e z ‟  
government:  inflation  skyrocketed,  drug  exports  were  high,  workers  furiously  protested,  public 
order was out of control, and Industry and other economic sectors were deeply discontent. Many 
v o i c e s   c l a i m e d   L o p e z ‟ s   r e n o u n c e .     T h e   e n t i r e   c r i s i s   u n l e a s h e d   w h i l e   L o p e z ‟ s   g o v e r n m e n t   r e i n f o r c e d  
i n v e s t o r s   a n d   p o l i t i c i a n s ‟   p e r c e p t i o n   o f   a   n o t -so bright and promising future in the country, at least,  
through orthodox channels. Lopez, nonetheless, managed to modestly finish his period leaving a 
b i t t e r   t a s t e   o f   w h a t   w a s   c a l l e d   “ n e o l i b e r a l   p o l i c i e s ”   a n d   m a k i n g   c l e a r   i t s   i n a b i l i t y   i n   o v e r c o m i n g  
p r i s o n e r ‟ s   d i l e m m a s .   T h e  following presidential election in 1978, placed into office a government 
that compensated main players by reducing taxes, raising key trade tariffs, and overall expanding 
spending. The game played from this point on is one of protectionism – although lesser in relation to 
preceding governments. Also, it was a game of low private investment and relative macroeconomic 
s t a b i l i t y .   T h i s   r e v e r s a l   w a s   f r a m e d   b y   L a t i n   A m e r i c a ‟ s   r e t u r n   t o   p r o t e c t i o n i s m   a m i d s t   t h e   1 9 8 0 ‟ s  
debt  crisis.  Clearly,  the  incomplete  achievemen t s   o f   L o p e z ‟ s   i n i t i a t i v e ,   a l o n g   w i t h   o t h e r  
international circumstances, crafted a subsequent policymaking which moved in opposite direction 
from free markets. In explaining this result, any sort of irrationality was required since all the 





The dominance of the financial sector and the downward break of investment, savings and 
o u t p u t   g r o w t h   i n   t h e   l e g a l   e c o n o m y   s i n c e   1 9 8 0 ‟ s   ( B e j a r a n o   1 9 8 5 a ;   C a r d e n a s 2002) could be placed 
i n   t h e   p o l i t i c a l   a n d   e c o n o m i c   d y n a m i c   c o n s o l i d a t e d   t h r o u g h o u t   1 9 7 0 ‟ s .     I n   t h e   s t r a t e g i c   i n t e r a c t i o n  
of the reforms, not only did the coffee boom but also the drug boom, both unexpected events, 
m o d i f y   p l a y e r s ‟   p a y o f f s .   T h e s e   s h o c k s   t ransformed  a  potential,  while  flawed,  scenario  of 
progressive institutional change into a scenario with opposing players and deficient coordination 
mechanisms. These actors were led by politicians trapped in a fragile institutional framework – e.g. 
corruption, legislative instability, and beckoned by hazardous alternatives for making profits. The 
extraordinary  profits  of  the  coffee  bonanza  built  financial  wealth  that  had  little  incentives, 
comparatively speaking, to get into traditional productive sectors. What the country would come 
through since 1980 was the consolidation and entrenchment of new domestic players as well as the 
accommodation of the incumbent ones
55. Certainly, there would be institutional innovation and 
economic growth but not the type that spread jobs and investment opportunities democratically, nor 
social welfare – including law and order, for more groups in the society.  
 
Comparing economic reforms in Colombia with those implemented in Chile or Korea needs 
to take into account idiosyncratic elements introducing crucial differences. Overall, outcomes out of 
e c o n o m i c   r e f o r m s   s i g n a l   s t a t e s ‟   a b i l i t y   t o   c o h e r e n t l y   a n d   c o n v i n c i n g l y   e s t a b l i s h   n e w   p o l i t i c a l   a n d  
economic  equilibria.  Here,  innovating  forces  could  stem  from  either  endogenous  forces  or 
exogenous shocks. Investors make a complete reading of possibilities, giving a negative or positive 
evaluation, and setting the path to follow. However, channels and tools for pro-economic growth 
equilibrium to happen are varied and extremely versatile as these three cases illustrate it.  
 
  Finally, it remains a comment on the role that macroeconomic stability has played since 
1 9 7 0 ‟ s   i n   t h e   c o u n t r y .   C o l o m b i a n   P o l i c y m a k e r s   h a v e   s t r i v e d   t o   s t i m u l a t e   i n v e s t m e n t   a n d   g r o w t h .  
They  have  been  proud  of  keeping  the  country  far  from  extremes  that  other  Latin  American 
counterparts  have  experienced.  This  stability  is  part  of  the  puzzle  that  this  economy  poses  to 
a n a l y s t s   b e c a u s e   i n   s p i t e   o f   t h i s   s t a b i l i t y ,   t h e   e c o n o m y ‟ s   p r o d u c t i v e   b a s e   h a s   m o d e s t l y   e x p a n d e d  
and  unemployment  is  persistently  high  as  well  as  poverty.  After  the  glorious  years  of  Coffee, 
Colombian productive pattern seems nebulous. Thus, there are actors who have nastily regarded 
these  technocratic  achievements  since  stabilization  policies  have  eventually  been  antagonistic 
toward what productive sectors and social welfare have required – e.g. exchange rate management, 
interest rates, social expenditure. As a result, this stability may be perceived as a bad instead of a 
good; a painful constraint intended to please international actors at expenses of domestic actors. 
Though this negative sentiment against economic reforms carries some truth as Stiglitz has pointed 
it  out,  it  is  flawed  to  conclude  that  macroeconomic  stability  must  be  thrown  away  and  that 
competition does not need to be stimulated. In the same way, it is equally flawed to insist that there 
is only one way – the unfair one, for carrying the costs entailed by macroeconomic stabilization and 
structural  adjustment.    Macroeconomic  stability  is  a  necessary  but  not  sufficient  condition  for 
e c o n o m i c   g r o w t h .   T h e r e f o r e ,   t h e   e m p h a s i s   m u s t   b e   o n   h o w   t o   b r i n g   i n t o   p o l i c y m a k e r s ‟   t o o l b o x   t h e  
a c t i o n s   t h a t   t h e y   n e e d   t o   o v e r c o m e   p r i s o n e r ‟ s   d i l e m m a s   a n d   a p p r o a c h   t o   t r u l y   d e m o c r a t i c   s i t u a t i o n s .  




                                                 
55 Rocha identifies several stages in the relationship of the drug traffic  with the Colombian  society: the 
opportunistic phase (1980-1980), the catalytic phase (1986-1990), the confrontation phase (1991-1995) and 
the mimetization phase (1996-1998). Rocha (2000, 151 and ss).   
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Appendix 2: Games in strategic form and their equilibria 
 
 
The shadowed rows and columns are dominated strategies 
 
 
H i g h   C o f f e e   P r i c e s :   T h e   P r i s o n e r ‟ s   D i l e m m a    
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Industry:     C is a dominated strategy 
Coalition G-C:   Taking into account that D is a dominant strategy for I, then FD is a 
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2. Coalition G-I 
 




           
 





Coffee:     C is a dominated strategy 
Coalition G-I:   Taking into account that D is a dominant strategy for I, then  
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B. Assurance Game  
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Appendix 3: OLS estimations of inflation 
 
*Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 10%. 
 
 
gm2  = Annual growth rate of means of payments at the quarter end (percentage) 
GDP    = Annual real GDP growth rate  
 
lcoffeeipt  = Logarithm of international coffee price for Colombian quality at the end of 
the quarter (US cents/pound) 
lcoffeept  = Logarithm of the minimum internal coffee price at the end of the  quarter 
(pesos/125 pounds) 
 
devt  = Annual nominal exchange rate growth at the quarter end (percentage)  
deft    = Annual central government fiscal deficit as a GDP share (percentage) 
  
Lir  = Logarithm of the net international reserves at the quarter end (millions of 
dollars) 
lm2lir  = logarithm of means of payments at the end of the quarter by Lir 
 
Dependent variable: Inflation 
Independent 
variable 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (6)Robust 
White 




























lcoffeep    4.0856* 
.8827 
         










lcoffeeip_1        6.6263** 
3.5507 
     
def          -.5367 
.527 
   
Dev          -.0388 
.1942 
   




























Observations  60  60  60  59  60  58  58 





The  dependent  variable  is  measured  monthly,  the  means  of  payments  are  measured 
quarterly and the real GDP as well as the fiscal deficit are measured yearly. The other 
variables as price coffee, devaluation, international reserves are measured monthly.  
 
The number of observations is 60 corresponding to the period 1968-1982 (four quarters by 
fifteen years).  
 
Consumer Price Index:  
DANE (The National Department of Statistic) and Banco de la Republica (The Central 
Bank of Colombia). 
http://www.banrep.gov.co/estad/dsbb/ctanal1sr.htm#indice 
 
Means of payments:  
Central Bank of Colombia  
Principales indicadores económicos 1923-1927, Banco de la Republica, 1993, Bogota. 
 
Real GDP: 
DANE (The National Department of Statistic) and Banco de la Republica (The Central 
Bank of Colombia).  
El crecimiento económico Colombiano en el siglo XX, grupo GRECO, Banco de la 
Republica, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2002, Bogota. 
 
Coffee Prices:  




Appendix 4: Legislative itinerary of the reforms 
 
 
Reform  Date  Comments 
 
Trade Reform  Law 6
th of 1971 and Law 8
th 
of 1973 
Presidential faculties for modifying trade 
tariffs and thus furthering Latin American 
trade integration
56. 
Financial Reform  1974    Officially approved u n d e r   M .   P a s t r a n a ‟ s  
presidency 
 
A . L .   M i c h e l s e n ‟ s   P r e s i d e n c y   b e g a n   o n   A u g u s t   7








th, 1974  Capital owners, unions and government 
meet in order to diagnose economic 




th, 1974.   Extraordinary executive faculties aimed at 
bringing down the inflation and budget 
deficit for 45 days. 
Tax Reform  September 18
th , 1974  Elimination of tax exemptions for SOEs 
and mix enterprises.  
The goal was to increase revenues and 




Reduction in subsidies to exports (CAT). 
September 20
th , 1974 
 
Increases in sale taxes. 
September 19
th , 1974 and 
October 21
st , 1974 
Changes in income taxes  
 
 





Tax Reform  December 20
th, 1974.  
 
Modification of the tax legislation recently 
enacted. 
Extraordinary faculties for 15 days. 
It defined who and which activities are 
obliged to pay and established 
exemptions
58.  
                                                 
56 Ocampo (1996, 267). 
57 Once the Economic Emergency ended, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional several dispositions. 
Subsequent amendments to the tax reform took place; see El Tiempo, October 13
th, 1974 page 1. The 
modifications included a reduction in taxes on coffee sales (El Tiempo, November 3
rd, 1974 Page 1), and tax 
amnesty to defaulters (El Tiempo, November 20
th, 1974, page 1 and December 5
th, 1974, page 1). Finally, the 
government was able to annul tax exemptions to specific sectors but conceded subsidies to exports and weak 
sectors such as agriculture (El Tiempo, November 28






th, 1974.   Extraordinary faculties for 12 months. 
It conferred broad faculties to regulate, 
merge and suppress state institutions. 
Trade Reform  December 26
th ,1974 
March 6
th , 1975 
April 1
st ,   1975 
April 30
th , 1975 
  2
nd May 1975 
Decrease in trade tariffs.  
Measures based on the Law 6
th of 1971.  
The reductions complied with the 
C a r t a g e n a ‟ s   A g r e e m e n t .    
 
State of Siege June, 1975 
 
 
Coffee prices skyrocketed on September, 1975 
 
Trade Reform  August 11
th , 1975  
September 8
th , 1975  
October 21
st ,   1975  
December 5
th , 1975. 
Decreases in trade tariffs that were aimed 




   
December 12
th, 1975.    It prohibited new foreign investment in 
financial sector and forced existing 
investment to become mix enterprises.  It 
e x e m p t e d   m e m b e r s   o f   t h e   C a r t a g e n a ‟ s  
Agreement. 
 





th January 1976  Suppression of public jobs and 
redistribution of functions inside some 
public institutions.   
 




Trade Reform  January 11
th , 1977    O f f i c i a l   a d h e r e n c e   t o   t h e   “ I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
t r a d e   A g r e e m e n t   o f   T e x t i l e s ” ,  which was 
established on December 20
th , 1973. 
 




The Largest National Strike on September 14
th, 1977 
 
Tax Reform  September 24
th, 1977  Increases in the subsidy to exports (CAT). 
The subsidy changes from 1%, 5% and 
                                                                                                                                                     
58 The subsequent modifications on the income tax were enacted through the decrees # 2821 (Dec/20/74) and 
#2848 (Dec/26/74). As for the sale tax, the modifications were introduced by the decrees # 2815 (Dec/20/74), 
and # 2810 (Dic/18/74).  
59 The minister, Rodrigo Botero, the viceminister, Joaquin Bohorquez, and the general secretary, Jorge Cook, 
renounced. Decrees #2748, #2754 and #2755. 
60 At this time Coffee producers expressed their concern despite the fact that the prices were as least twice as 
those one year ago. El Tiempo, July 26
th, 1977, page 2A.  
 
58 
12%, to 5%,8% and 12% respectively.
61 
The Minister of Finance renounced on October 3
rd, 1977.  









The executive introduced a project on tax 
reductions and exceptions that modify the 
regime for occasional profits. The changes 
in tariffs were motivated by the high 
inflation but also they were aimed at 
stimulating firms.  
December 23






th , 1978.   Extraordinary faculties so as to modify 
payments for and allocation of public 
employees. 
Trade Reform  July 14
th and 26
th , 1978  It reestablished previous import licenses 
for products like polyethylene, synthetic 
textiles, and glasses, among others.   
 
July 31
st , 1978  It established tariffs for regional trade 
partners.   
 
Presidency of J. C. Turbay started on August 7
th , 1978 
 
Tax Reform  September 21
st , 1978  It established subsidies to exports (CAT) 
according to each product.  
Trade Reform  September 28
th, 1978  R e d u c e d   t a r i f f s   f o r   C a r t a g e n a ‟ s   a g r e e m e n t  
members. 
November 11
th 1978.  It levied a 50% import tax on some capital 
goods permanently. 
Source: Diario Oficial 1974-78, El Tiempo 1974-78. 
                                                 
61 El Tiempo, September 24
th, 1977, Page 1A.   
62 El Tiempo, October 3
rd, 1977, page 1ª and October 5th, 1977, page 1ª. 
63 El Tiempo, October 26, 1977, page 1A. 
64 This Law #54 in 1977 was implemented throughout the decrees #2997 (Dec/30/77), #0089 (Jan,23/78), 
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